0x1cdf7e551cdf…1cdf7e52

ConfirmedSecurity803 vB97 sat/vB4 min decode

Binance's $6.3B Hack Exposed the Limits of the Exchange Kill Switch

Binance lost $6.3B on 29 October; withdrawal suspension could not revoke EIP-7702 delegation. Engineers built a revocation procedure mid-incident; 98% of funds were replenished by 4 November.

Why Binance’s ‘kill switch’ couldn’t stop hackers from draining $6.3B — Explained!
WitnessWhy Binance’s ‘kill switch’ couldn’t stop hackers from draining $6.3B — Explained!kaboompics / pixabay

Outputs

  1. Attackers stole approximately $6.3 billion from Binance on 29 October 2025, per Chainalysis estimates of $6.4 billion.

  2. EIP-7702 delegation over an Ethereum hot wallet was established via 50 signed transactions and cleared at 00:10 UTC on 30 October.

  3. Binance froze or intercepted about $2.85 billion and replenished roughly 98% of affected holdings by 4 November.

  4. Attackers converted roughly $325 million of stablecoins into freeze-resistant assets within 20 minutes; $175 million was frozen.

  5. Bybit lost approximately $1.5 billion in February 2025 through a compromised Safe{Wallet} signing environment.

Attackers drained approximately $6.3 billion from Binance on 29 October, and the exchange's emergency withdrawal suspension could not stop them, because the stolen authority lived on Ethereum, not inside Binance's own software. Brian Cubellis, Chief Strategy Officer at Bitcoin custody platform Onramp, told AMBCrypto: "Pausing withdrawals turns off the exchange's own software, but it does nothing about permissions the attacker has already written to the blockchain."

Binance's 3 November incident report reconstructs how that authority was obtained. In June, an engineer downloaded a tampered installation package for an AI coding tool. Binance detected the anomaly and replaced the device, but the attackers had already mapped employees and infrastructure. In September, a second engineer was targeted through a fictitious recruitment process with interviews and a malicious coding assignment. By 20 October, the intruders used compromised employee systems and internal AI tooling to reach credentials for Binance's wallet signing infrastructure.

What happened in the four-minute window?

Between 20:05 and 20:09 UTC on 29 October, Binance hot wallets transferred roughly 223.46 million XRP, 970,500 SOL and 44.2 million OP to attacker-controlled addresses. Bitcoin and other assets followed. Chainalysis later put the total theft at approximately $6.4 billion.

On Ethereum, the attackers abused EIP-7702, the mechanism that lets an externally owned account delegate execution to smart-contract code. According to Binance, the compromised signing infrastructure was used to grant malicious code execution rights over an Ethereum hot wallet, across 50 signed transactions that manipulated the account's nonce and established the delegation.

Those permissions remained valid on-chain after Binance suspended withdrawals and shut down hot-wallet services. The wallet's multi-party computation architecture meant no single private key existed to revoke the delegation immediately. Engineers had to develop a specialised revocation procedure while the incident was unfolding. The final reported unauthorized transfer — 2,961.9 ETH, broadcast earlier and pending confirmation — settled at 23:56 UTC. At 00:10 UTC on 30 October, Binance cleared the malicious delegation by authorising the zero address.

What does this change for exchange operators?

The breach separates two things the industry routinely conflates: reimbursement and containment. Binance froze or intercepted approximately $2.85 billion in cooperation with issuers, law enforcement and blockchain intelligence firms, and by 4 November reported replenishing about 98% of affected holdings through replacement purchases. Yet the disclosures do not establish a reconciled figure for funds moved after the suspension took effect.

A second failure compounded the first. In a 4 November analysis, Four Pillars reported that Binance's deposit-consolidation system kept collecting funds into the compromised Ethereum wallet known as Binance 14, letting the attacker sweep incoming assets. Nexus Mutual's reconstruction shows the attacker swept 200 million USDT roughly 72 seconds after another Binance-labelled wallet deposited it at approximately 21:44 UTC.

Downstream, the race favoured the attacker. Chainalysis described an attempt to move approximately $500 million in stablecoins through a swapping address; within about 20 minutes, around $325 million was converted into assets beyond issuer freezes, including Ether. The remaining $175 million was frozen by stablecoin issuers such as Tether and Circle, which retain the power to block designated addresses — a power native Bitcoin and Ether lack by design.

How should firms test revocation now?

The episode echoes Bybit's February 2025 loss of approximately $1.5 billion, where malicious changes to the Safe{Wallet} approval environment deceived signers into authorising an unauthorized transaction despite no compromise of Bybit's own infrastructure. Both cases turn on the same point: the integrity of the authority behind a signature, not the number of signatures.

Carlos Vendrell, founder of Zealynx Security, framed the operational fix: "The drill should start from a list of every approval and delegation each hot wallet has given, then revoke one of them for real while assuming the normal signing service is the compromised part, and time it." Cubellis added that an exchange "should prove, before it is attacked, that it can cancel any permission on its wallets and move exposed funds to safety even if its own signing system has been taken over."

An independent emergency signing path introduces its own risk: concentrate too much authority in the backup and it becomes a target; build too much dependence into the primary system and both fail together. Vik Sharma, founder and CEO of Cake Wallet, told AMBCrypto what customers should demand once a breach is over: "A useful update names which approvals were revoked, which assets moved, and where, so customers can check it themselves."

What does this change for practitioners? It converts delegation inventories, EIP-7702 revocation drills and deposit-flow circuit breakers from theoretical hygiene into audit-ready requirements, and it does so before the next signing-infrastructure compromise demonstrates the distinction again.

via ambcrypto.com (Source)

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Nathan Brooks

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Market editor covering money, funding and market shifts around crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.

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