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Blockchain Review Counts $2,260 in Apparent Victim Payments
A later blockchain review put apparent victim payments from an Optimizely-delivered JavaScript campaign at $2,260, revising an earlier $7,040 tally that did not establish total stolen funds.

Outputs
A later blockchain review counted about $2,260 across 19 apparent victim payments on Nov. 16.
The earlier $7,040 wallet-receipt tally included $4,920 in swapped stablecoins and 0.076 BTC returned to the same wallet.
Removing a possibly attacker-origin $51 transfer would reduce the estimate to about $2,210, but the figures do not fully reconcile.
Malicious code appeared in 188 infected snippets tied to 178 organizations; actual reach may be higher.
Optimizely listed the incident as “Monitoring” at 8:02 p.m. ET Monday, or 01:02 UTC Tuesday.
By Elena Vasquez
A later blockchain review counted about $2,260 in 19 apparent victim payments tied to a malicious JavaScript campaign delivered through Optimizely. The estimate revised an earlier $7,040 tally that did not establish total stolen funds.
What changed in the victim-payment estimate?
The review covered blockchain data through 1:45 a.m. ET Tuesday (06:45 UTC) and classified 19 payments on Nov. 16 as “apparent victim payments.” On a simple average, those transfers amount to roughly $119 each, although one $51 transfer carries uncertain attribution. The earlier wallet-receipt tally came at 2:25 p.m. ET Monday (19:25 UTC), placing the snapshots 11 hours and 20 minutes apart.
The earlier $7,040 total included $4,920 in stablecoins routed through a swap, then 0.076 Bitcoin (BTC) returning to the same wallet. The stablecoin leg equaled about 70% of that preliminary tally; the source did not break out a dollar value for the Bitcoin return.
Excluding the $51 transfer that might have originated with the attacker would reduce the later estimate to about $2,210. The figures still do not fully reconcile, which leaves the difference between the two counts unexplained.
The review’s use of “apparent” matters. It did not convert the lower figure into a confirmed loss total, and it did not explain the full difference between the two snapshots. The review also named no blockchain, threat actors or law-enforcement activity, so the payment count cannot establish attribution.
On the available evidence, $2,260 represents apparent victim payments, while $7,040 does not represent confirmed losses.
How did the script reach visitors?
The malicious code appeared in 188 infected snippets tied to 178 organizations, according to the review. The source cautioned that actual reach may be higher, leaving 178 as a documented association count rather than a reliable ceiling.
Its functions included:
- Replacing cryptocurrency addresses on webpages and in copied text.
- Collecting card details entered into forms.
- Capturing some cookies and screenshots.
- Delivering exploit kits to iOS devices.
Those capabilities created exposure beyond crypto wallets. A substituted address could send a visitor’s payment somewhere other than the intended recipient, while form capture, screenshots and iOS exploit kits created risks to card data, cookie-based sessions and device security.
None of this required a breach of every affected organization’s server. Once a third-party script carried the malicious code, it could reach visitors across multiple sites without compromising each site’s own infrastructure.
In plain terms, one third-party script could extend the campaign across many organizations without evidence of a separate server compromise at each site.
What did Optimizely change?
Optimizely said it fixed a vulnerability in its Experimentation product, removed injected code from affected projects, secured affected accounts and added delivery protections. The company listed the incident status as “Monitoring” in an update posted Monday at 8:02 p.m. ET (01:02 UTC Tuesday).
That statement reports four remediation categories but supplies no counts for affected projects, compromised accounts, attempted transfers or confirmed fraud losses. It also does not set a date for ending monitoring, so “Monitoring” signals continued scrutiny rather than a final closure.
The public account does not independently verify the cleanup, account security or delivery protections. The review’s unreconciled figures compound that gap: apparent payments cannot yet be tied to a complete, reconciled loss total.
Optimizely has described remedial action, but not a final accounting.
The next credible checkpoint is the end of Optimizely’s “Monitoring” phase, though no date or reporting deadline appears in the current record. Until a later review reconciles the $51 transfer with uncertain origin and the wider gap between snapshots, the defensible figure remains about $2,260 in apparent victim payments, not $7,040 in confirmed losses.
via tokenpost.com (Source)
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Staff writer covering regulation, policy and their impact on crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.
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