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Compound Governance Proposal Would Restrict Snapshot Voting to 24 Addresses
A Compound Governance Working Group proposal would limit Snapshot voting to identifiable addresses with 1 COMP and five prior votes — an initial roster of just 24 wallets holding 1.3 million COMP.

Outputs
Proposal published November 16, 2026 at 6:00 PM to Compound's governance forum by the Compound Governance Working Group
Initial eligible roster under new rules: 24 addresses holding approximately 1.3 million COMP
Passage requires at least 400,000 COMP in Yes votes
Voters must be identifiable, hold at least 1 COMP of delegated voting power, and have cast 5 governance votes in the prior 12 months
Voting power tied to dCOMP positions is explicitly excluded over security and coordination concerns
A proposal published to Compound's governance forum on November 16, 2026 at 6:00 PM would restrict voting in the protocol's comp-vote.eth Snapshot space to a pool of just 24 addresses holding approximately 1.3 million COMP. The Compound Governance Working Group drafted the changes, which would impose identification, token-holding and participation requirements on anyone casting a vote in that off-chain layer of the protocol's governance process. The Snapshot space is distinct from Compound's on-chain Governor voting mechanism, and the proposal targets only the former.
The timing is notable: a rule set that would shrink the eligible voter base to two dozen addresses arrives amid an industry-wide debate over whether DAO governance has become too concentrated. Compound's working group appears to have reached the opposite conclusion — that restricting participation improves it. The proposal itself carries a high bar for adoption, requiring at least 400,000 COMP in Yes votes to pass, roughly 31 percent of the COMP held by the addresses that would qualify under the new rules.
What would voters need to prove?
The proposal sets out three conditions. Each is concrete; each also raises questions the text does not fully answer.
- Identifiability. A voter must maintain a forum profile, represent a known entity, or hold an ENS name tied to their voting address. The stated aim is to discourage anonymous or disposable addresses from participating.
- Minimum voting power. An address must hold at least 1 COMP of delegated voting power — a modest but concrete threshold.
- Participation history. An address must have cast at least 5 distinct Compound governance votes within the prior 12 months.
The third condition is the most restrictive. It would immediately exclude any address without an established voting track record, meaning new entrants to Compound governance would face a year-long wait before they could vote in the Snapshot space at all. In plain words: the proposal trades openness for accountability, and it does so by locking the door for newcomers.
What is excluded — and why it matters
The proposal explicitly excludes voting power tied to a position called dCOMP, citing security and coordination concerns. The exclusion signals unease within the working group about instruments that decouple economic exposure from direct token custody, even as the proposal's identification requirements push in the opposite direction by formalizing who stands behind each vote. The document does not detail the specific security risks that dCOMP positions present, and that gap leaves the rationale open to challenge during the voting window.
The identification requirement deserves scrutiny of its own. An ENS name, a forum profile or an entity affiliation establishes a thin layer of pseudonymous accountability rather than legal identity. It raises the cost of Sybil-style coordination — one party operating many addresses — but it does not eliminate it, since nothing prevents a single operator from registering multiple ENS names or forum profiles. Whether that partial friction justifies cutting the voter base to 24 addresses is the central question the community must now weigh.
How narrow is the eligible pool?
The arithmetic is stark. An initial eligible roster under the new rules would include 24 addresses holding approximately 1.3 million COMP. By comparison, the proposal's own 400,000 COMP passage threshold means fewer than a quarter of the eligible holders — assuming full turnout — would need to approve the change for it to take effect. Concentration of this degree cuts both ways: it makes capture by outside actors harder, but it makes coordination among a small incumbents' circle easier. The proposal text does not address what happens to the eligibility roster over time, how addresses join it, or whether the 12-month lookback resets for first-time participants.
The 1 COMP minimum, described in the proposal as modest, is unlikely to filter anyone seriously engaged in governance. The real filters are the identity proof and the five-vote history, which together function as a gatekeeping mechanism rather than a stake requirement. Taken together, the three conditions describe a system designed for a known, repeat-participating electorate of a size that fits around a conference table.
What happens next?
The proposal now sits before the forum for discussion before any Snapshot vote occurs. Its fate depends on whether the same concentrated holder base it would enshrine chooses to ratify it — a structural irony the working group has not addressed. If adopted, the rules would take effect for the comp-vote.eth space while leaving Compound's on-chain Governor mechanism untouched, creating a two-tier governance system with materially different access requirements at each layer. The community's response during the discussion period will indicate whether security-focused eligibility filters become a template for other DAOs or remain a Compound-specific experiment.
via cryptonews.net (Source)
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Staff writer covering regulation, policy and their impact on crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.
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