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Curve Fee Burner Exploit Drained $38,200 in DAO Revenue
Curve Finance says a signature flaw in its CowSwapBurner let an attacker drain $38,200 in DAO fees via 138 forged orders. User deposits were untouched.

Outputs
An attacker stole $38,200 in DAO fee revenue via 138 forged orders on November 10.
The flaw was in the CowSwapBurner's isValidSignature function, which ignored the actual CoW Protocol order hash.
Most stolen funds reached Hyperliquid via Arbitrum and were swapped for 65.41 XMR1, a Monero-linked asset.
A governance proposal to replace the burner with an auction system closes on November 20.
Curve audited all 6,558 burner orders since June 2024 and found only the 138 unauthorized ones diverted proceeds.
An attacker extracted $38,200 in DAO fee revenue from Curve Finance on November 10 by exploiting a signature verification flaw in the protocol's Ethereum fee conversion contract, executing 138 forged trading orders in a single weekly window, according to Curve's security incident disclosure.
The exploit targeted the CowSwapBurner contract, which converts accumulated administrative fees into crvUSD for distribution to the DAO. Curve confirmed that no user deposits, lending markets or crvUSD holdings were affected. The stolen funds — 38,205.76 USDC — remain unrecovered.
How did the attack work?
The vulnerability sat in the contract's isValidSignature function, which approves trading orders submitted through CoW Protocol. The function checked whether the order described in the signature data met Curve's requirements: selling tokens for crvUSD, directing proceeds to the FeeCollector, and receiving at least 500 crvUSD.
It never verified that the description matched the order actually being executed. The contract ignored the order hash supplied by CoW Protocol, so the attacker could attach a legitimate order's description to an entirely different transaction. Because the burner had already granted CoW Protocol unlimited allowances over its tokens, forged orders redirected proceeds to an external wallet whenever the exchange window was open.
The first fraudulent transaction settled at 00:07 UTC on November 10 — seven minutes after the weekly trading window opened. It sold the burner's YB token balance for USDC. The attacker then reused the same legitimate description to authorize 137 more transactions across other tokens. By 00:24 UTC, 133 orders had settled; the final one cleared at 11:10 UTC.
Why were user funds unaffected?
Curve's investigation found the attacker targeted accumulated administrative fee balances, not deposited assets. Under the protocol's routine, fees transfer to the burner on Mondays, sell during a 24-hour window from Tuesday, and distribute on Wednesdays. That weekly conversion continued to run normally throughout the incident.
The scale of each forged order was modest. The median fraudulent order was worth roughly $254, and only two exceeded $500. Most of the drained balances had sat unsold because they fell below the contract's 500 crvUSD minimum sale threshold. Among previously traded tokens, the median time since the last sale was 161 days.
Legitimate operations ran in parallel: 36 valid orders across 35 tokens generated 97,317.74 crvUSD for the FeeCollector during the same window. Curve audited all 6,558 orders settled through the burner since its June 2024 deployment and identified the 138 unauthorized transactions as the only ones whose proceeds bypassed the FeeCollector.
Where did the funds go?
Within four hours of the exploit, the attacker swapped 37,611.76 USDC for ETH, split the funds across four addresses and bridged them to Arbitrum. Approximately 37,229.89 USDC reached Hyperliquid, where it was exchanged for 65.41 XMR1, a Monero-linked asset. Curve reported that balance untouched as of November 16. On November 15, the attacker converted the remaining 594 USDC into ETH and deposited 0.3 ETH into Tornado Cash.
What does this change for practitioners?
The immediate operational consequence is a pause. Following an external vulnerability report on November 10, Curve's Emergency DAO disabled fee collection and trading on Ethereum at 13:59 UTC, with precautionary measures on Arbitrum and Base at 16:55 UTC. Ethereum fee conversion remains paused while fees continue to accumulate — revenue is deferred, not lost. On November 17, the Emergency DAO moved residual token balances from the old burner contracts on Ethereum, Base and Arbitrum back to their respective FeeCollector contracts.
The incident is also the third security event to touch Curve's infrastructure in under two years, though the earlier cases — a May 2025 DNS hijacking that forced a domain migration and a March 2026 LlamaLend incident — involved unrelated attack surfaces.
The structural fix is now before governance. A DAO proposal opened on November 13 and closing November 20 would replace the vulnerable burner with a descending-price auction system that verifies the actual order hash, closing the exact gap the attacker exploited. Until that vote settles and a replacement deploys, Ethereum fee conversion stays dark and the DAO's weekly crvUSD distribution schedule holds only as far as accumulated balances allow.
via crypto.news (Source)
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Market editor covering money, funding and market shifts around crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.
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