0x6567c3866567…6567c383

ConfirmedSecurity564 vB36 sat/vB3 min decode

Garuda DeFi Discloses Five October Security Incidents on Luna Classic

Garuda DeFi says five October incidents on Luna Classic affected staking pools, a developer wallet and the front end, with proceeds valued at $7,200 worth of LUNC plus 176 USDC.

Garuda DeFi Reports Five Security Incidents on Luna Classic in October
WitnessGaruda DeFi Reports Five Security Incidents on Luna Classic in Octoberstevepb / pixabay

Outputs

  1. Five incidents occurred over 12 days from Oct. 20 to Oct. 31.

  2. Garuda valued proceeds at $7,200 worth of LUNC plus 176 USDC.

  3. 36 NFT staking factory contracts were migrated on Oct. 20.

  4. The front end was hijacked from Oct. 25 through Oct. 27.

  5. On Oct. 31, the compromised wallet gained admin privileges and migrated 11 CW20 staking contracts.

By Tom Whitfield

Garuda DeFi said five security incidents during the 12 days from Oct. 20 through Oct. 31 produced attacker proceeds worth $7,200 in Luna Classic (LUNC) and 176 USDC, according to the project’s Nov. 6 update. The incidents affected staking pools, a developer wallet and the project’s front end, creating three distinct points of operational exposure.

Peter Kacherginsky said the incidents may be “some kind of record for a single project.” Garuda’s chronology combined contract migrations, asset removals, a compromised privileged wallet and a multi-day front-end takeover across its LUNC staking operations.

What changed on Oct. 20 and Oct. 21?

Garuda said 36 NFT staking factory contracts were migrated on Oct. 20. NFTs and rewards were then removed from the affected pools, while cross-staking pools lost staked funds and rewards the following day. The timing places the migration at the start of the 12-day incident window.

Those changes reached the contract and asset layers of the staking operation. The project reported a contract migration on one day and lost staked funds and rewards from cross-staking pools the next. For users, the operational consequence was the removal or loss of assets connected with affected pools.

What happened to the front end and developer wallet?

From Oct. 25 through Oct. 27, Garuda’s front end was hijacked to display wallet approval prompts designed to send funds to an attacker-controlled address. The interface had been repurposed to request wallet approvals that would route funds to that address. Garuda did not report how many users saw or approved the prompts.

On Oct. 26, overlapping the front-end period, the project disclosed that an attacker had compromised a developer wallet and taken its assets. The compromised address then migrated governance and protocol-fee contracts and withdrew their funds. That sequence placed the reported exposure beyond the interface and into contract administration, extending the incident to governance and fee functions.

What did the Oct. 31 admin action affect?

On Oct. 31, the compromised wallet gained admin privileges and used them to migrate 11 CW20 staking contracts and remove staked assets. The Oct. 20 action covered 36 NFT staking factory contracts, versus 11 CW20 staking contracts in the Oct. 31 action. The migrations affected distinct contract categories, extending the incident beyond NFT pools.

How did Garuda quantify the proceeds?

Garuda valued the proceeds at $7,200 worth of Luna Classic (LUNC), plus 176 USDC. The update presents that figure as the valuation of proceeds, not a full accounting of every affected pool. The amount should therefore be read alongside the operational reach: multiple staking pools, governance and protocol-fee contracts, a developer wallet and a hijacked front end.

The accounting distinguishes proceeds from operational reach. Staked funds and rewards disappeared from cross-staking pools; NFTs and rewards were removed from affected NFT pools; and assets were taken from the developer wallet. The malicious prompts separately targeted users through the front end from Oct. 25 through Oct. 27.

What remains to be verified?

For users, the consequential change is structural: staking contracts were migrated, assets were removed, and a compromised wallet obtained admin privileges. Any complete post-incident accounting now needs a contract-level view of custody and recovery, covering the 11 CW20 staking contracts changed on Oct. 31 and the governance and protocol-fee contracts whose funds were withdrawn.

via tokenpost.com (Source)

More from Tom Whitfield

Tom Whitfield

Show full bio

News editor covering technology and product news in crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.

1,374 articles