Hyun Song Shin to Lead BIS Payments Committee for Three Years

Bank of Korea Governor Hyun Song Shin assumed the chairmanship of the Bank for International Settlements’ Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures on Nov. 1, beginning a renewable three-year term. Governors meeting at the BIS Global Economy Meeting selected Shin for the role.

He succeeded Fabio Panetta, governor of the Bank of Italy. Shin’s current Bank of Korea governorship runs from April 21, 2026, through April 20, 2030.

At a central banking forum in Sintra, Portugal, on July 1, Shin said: “The central bank is absolutely at the core of it.” The remark concerned central banks’ role in a unified ledger. It signals institutional priority, but it does not resolve questions over access, interoperability, privacy or commercial ownership.

What authority does the CPMI chair actually hold?\n

The CPMI tracks activity in payment, clearing and settlement systems and develops related international standards and guidance. Its remit concerns the infrastructure through which money moves, rather than any single national payment scheme.

As chair, Shin leads the committee’s work plan, convenes its meetings, reports progress to the Global Economy Meeting and represents the committee externally. Those duties give him agenda-setting influence across central-bank payments policy.

However, the CPMI has no formal supranational authority and relies on its members to carry out its mandate. A CPMI report or standard can shape guidance, but national authorities and market participants must implement it through domestic legal and technical frameworks.

In practical terms, the chair can direct priorities, but cannot compel national implementation.

What does the digital-payment agenda cover?

The committee’s Oct. 29 report on central-bank roles in digital payments examined four areas:

• Fast payment systems
• Tokenized deposits
• Stablecoins
• Programmable payment platforms

Across those areas, the report considered how central banks issue money, operate payment systems, oversee those systems and help drive change. It therefore connects monetary issuance with operational oversight, an approach relevant to both bank deposits and newer settlement arrangements.

Yet the report is not itself a rulebook with binding cross-border force. Given the committee’s structure, it can inform standards and national policy, but it cannot impose obligations directly on banks, stablecoin issuers or payment operators.

The report widens the policy discussion, not the committee’s enforcement powers.

What has Project Hangang demonstrated?

Shin co-authored a paper with Bank of Korea colleagues about Project Hangang, which tested tokenized deposits through live transactions. The first phase ran for three months, from April through June 2025.

About 80,000 users and 12,000 selected merchants used tokenized deposits settled in tokenized central bank money. Those figures establish broad participation on both sides of the market, but they do not disclose transaction count, monetary value or system cost.

Operating for one quarter of a year supports feasibility, but not long-run scalability. The available details also omit service-level data, failure rates and the allocation of operating expenses, leaving commercial performance unproven.

Project Hangang shows a three-month live test with substantial participation, not proof of durable economics.

What can Shin change during his term?

Shin arrives with a committee already studying tokenized money and programmable settlement, rather than an empty mandate. The immediate test is whether his chairmanship turns that work into specific guidance, research milestones and national implementation plans.

The available details identify no fixed publication calendar, named deployment target or timetable for wider Project Hangang participation. They also omit transaction values and performance measures, limiting conclusions about commercial viability.

That omission matters because technical operation does not establish viable economics. A credible next phase would need disclosed volumes, service levels, cost allocation and explicit rules for commercial participation.

The decisive window is Shin’s three-year term: any market-structure change will depend on national adoption of CPMI guidance and on whether Project Hangang moves from participation metrics to verifiable transaction economics.