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K3 and Reental hit by exploits worth $3.9 million, Blockaid says

Blockaid flagged $3.9 million in exploit value across K3’s sBOLD vault and Reental’s contracts; a K3 pause followed, but key control questions remain unresolved.

Blockaid Flags $3.9 Million in K3 and Reental Exploits
WitnessBlockaid Flags $3.9 Million in K3 and Reental ExploitsPexels / pixabay

Outputs

  1. Blockaid flagged $3.9 million in K3 and Reental exploits.

  2. A PolygonScan record shows about 294,040 USDT0 moved at 6:41 a.m. ET on Nov. 18; Blockaid estimated $454,000 for the Reental drain.

  3. The sBOLD attack used a wstETH flash loan and the liquidation of the attacker’s own Liquity position, according to Blockaid.

  4. A May 19, 2025 ChainSecurity audit said self-liquidation value extraction “has been mitigated” in Version 3.

  5. K3 announced a pause but gave no reopening date or recovery commitment.

Blockaid flagged $3.9 million in K3 and Reental exploits, according to alerts describing separate attack paths. At 6:41 a.m. ET on Nov. 18, PolygonScan records show a successful transaction. It moved about 294,040 USDT0 from one of the contracts Blockaid identified to another address.

Blockaid described both incidents as ongoing when it issued the alerts. The Reental route ran through an administrator’s proxy upgrade. The sBOLD route combined a flash loan with a borrower’s self-liquidation.

A May 19, 2025 ChainSecurity audit examined self-liquidation risks. ChainSecurity said the possibility of extracting value that way “has been mitigated” in Version 3 of the code it reviewed. That historical finding does not establish whether the latest attack used the same flaw.

Reental: proxy upgrade enabled withdrawals

Blockaid estimated the Reental drain at $454,000; the recorded transfer accounts for only part of that figure. Reental’s RNT Lend product allows borrowers to pledge real-estate tokens as collateral and borrow stablecoins.

Blockaid described a separate route into the platform’s deposit-token contracts. An administrator upgraded the USDT and USDC proxies to code that allowed anyone to withdraw the underlying tokens. The remaining stablecoins were then swept out.

The alert did not establish who controlled the administrator or why the upgrade occurred. Until those questions are answered, counterparties cannot fully assess how the withdrawal rules changed. The $294,040 transfer confirms movement, but it does not answer either question.

sBOLD: flash loan and self-liquidation

Under Liquity’s documentation, sBOLD automatically reinvests rewards from $BOLD stablecoins deposited into Liquity V2’s Stability Pools. The pools use depositors’ $BOLD to repay undercollateralized loans in exchange for collateral. They also earn interest paid by borrowers.

K3 built and maintains the vault; Liquity’s core team does not. Users receive sBOLD shares representing their participation in the vault. The separation is operationally relevant because the affected product sits at K3’s layer above Liquity’s pools.

Blockaid said attackers used a flash loan of wrapped staked ether, or wstETH, and triggered liquidation of their own Liquity borrowing position. They then minted sBOLD shares cheaply, swapped collateral and redeemed $BOLD belonging to other depositors.

That sequence let attackers buy into the vault at a depressed valuation before extracting its assets. The path connected a borrower’s own liquidation, the share-minting process and other depositors’ $BOLD. K3’s initial statement did not explain the cause or announce reimbursement terms.

What does this change for depositors?

For sBOLD depositors, the immediate change is operational: K3 has announced a pause. The response did not bring a reopening date or recovery commitment. The practical answer remains incomplete. The audit addressed self-liquidation in Version 3, while the latest attack remains unexplained. Depositors still lack a confirmed cause, reimbursement terms or a timetable for restoring the vault.

For Reental users, the open questions sit with the contract controls: who controlled the administrator, why the proxies changed and what the $454,000 estimate comprises. The recorded transfer of about 294,040 USDT0 confirms only part of the movement.

No reopening deadline has been set, leaving the next checkpoint in K3’s disclosure of the cause, reimbursement terms and recovery plan, plus any Reental disclosure identifying the administrator and explaining the upgrade.

via cryptonews.net (Source)

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Marcus Bennett

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Senior reporter covering money, funding and market shifts around crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.

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