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K3 Capital and Reental lose $3.9M in separate DeFi exploits

K3 Capital's sBOLD vault lost $3.88M on Ethereum and Reental lost $454K on Polygon after a proxy upgrade let anyone withdraw user stablecoins.

K3 Capital and Reental lose $3.9M in separate DeFi exploits
WitnessK3 Capital and Reental lose $3.9M in separate DeFi exploitsjamesmarkosborne / pixabay

Outputs

  1. K3 Capital's sBOLD vault lost roughly $3.88 million in a Nov. 18 exploit on Ethereum.

  2. Reental lost approximately $454,000 in USDT and USDC across two transactions on Polygon.

  3. ChainSecurity's May 19, 2025 audit logged two critical, three high and eight medium findings, all marked corrected.

  4. Blockaid tied the Reental loss to an administrator upgrading proxy contracts to a version allowing open withdrawal.

  5. Curve Finance's proposal to replace its vulnerable fee-conversion contract closes Nov. 20.

Two DeFi platforms lost a combined $3.9 million in separate exploits on Nov. 18, according to on-chain analysis by security firm Blockaid. K3 Capital's sBOLD vault on Ethereum lost roughly $3.88 million, while real-estate tokenization platform Reental lost about $454,000 in stablecoins on Polygon after a contract upgrade.

Blockaid summarized the sBOLD attack as minting cheap sBOLD shares, swapping the collateral and redeeming other depositors' $BOLD. The firm published an Ethereum wallet tied to the attack, a helper address and an example transaction. sBOLD is a third-party product run by K3 Capital, not by Liquity's core team, according to Liquity's documentation. Users deposit $BOLD in exchange for sBOLD shares, and the vault reinvests rewards from Liquity V2 stability pools.

What did the audits flag?

Prior reviews of the vault's code examined a closely related risk. In its May 19, 2025 assessment, ChainSecurity found a high-severity accounting flaw in which an earlier version of the software could undervalue sBOLD shares after liquidations, potentially letting malicious participants pull out funds belonging to other depositors. The firm marked the issue corrected after changes factored collateral into the vault's valuation, writing that the possibility of value extraction through self-liquidations had been mitigated.

That audit recorded two critical, three high-severity and eight medium-severity findings, all listed as corrected. A separate May 2025 review by Dedaub examined the vault's reliance on $BOLD market liquidity and its ability to price the stablecoin accurately. It is not yet established whether the Nov. 18 attack exploited the previously identified accounting weakness or a different flaw.

Crypto.news said it contacted K3 Capital for comment and had not received a response at publication time.

How was Reental drained?

The second incident targeted Reental, a real-estate tokenization platform on Polygon. Blockaid said an administrator upgraded the proxy contracts behind the platform's USDT and USDC deposit tokens, known as aTokens, to a contract that allowed anyone to withdraw the underlying stablecoins. Remaining stablecoin balances were then swept out.

Roughly $454,000 had been drained across two transactions when the alert was published. Blockaid shared one address linked to the exploit and two affected contracts. Reental's public documentation describes tokenized loans and property-linked shares in Spain and the United States.

Why do the two failures differ?

Both breaches show how the same period of market weakness that pushes yield-hungry users into vaults and tokenized products also gives attackers more surface to probe. Vault designs that lean on third-party collateral accounting carry unique risk: a single pricing flaw can be turned against every depositor at once. Reental's case is a different failure mode, where an administrative upgrade — not market manipulation — put user funds at risk.

The two incidents land alongside renewed DeFi lending competition for idle bank deposits, which has pushed more capital into yield-bearing onchain products in recent months. For retail users, the practical lesson is that audits flag risks but do not remove them; users should check who actually operates a vault before depositing, not just which protocol it connects to.

What comes next?

The key open questions are how much of the roughly $3.88 million can be traced or recovered and whether either platform confirms the root cause of its breach. A clearer picture of the sBOLD flaw would indicate whether similar vaults built on Liquity V2 need remediation. Meanwhile, the Curve Finance governance proposal to replace its vulnerable fee-conversion contract closes on Nov. 20.

via cryptonews.net (Source)

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