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Peapods Finance Withdraws 98%-99% of Layer-2 Liquidity

Peapods Finance said it removed 98%-99% of layer-2 liquidity after abnormal PEAS minting linked to a possibly compromised deployer key, while urging users to withdraw LP and LVF positions.

Peapods Finance Removes 98% to 99% of Layer-2 Liquidity After Abnormal PEAS Minting
WitnessPeapods Finance Removes 98% to 99% of Layer-2 Liquidity After Abnormal PEAS Mintingfancycrave1 / pixabay

Outputs

  1. Peapods said it removed 98%-99% of layer-2 liquidity.

  2. The possibly compromised deployer key had been used to set PEAS minting permissions and create tokens on layer 2.

  3. PEAS was bridged from layer 2 to mainnet and sold, according to Peapods' preliminary account.

  4. PEAS cannot be minted directly on mainnet; only already-bridged liquidity can be extracted there.

  5. Users were advised to temporarily remove all on-chain LP and LVF positions during the investigation and recovery effort.

By Daniel Okafor

Peapods Finance said it had "removed 98% to 99% of layer-2 liquidity" after abnormal PEAS minting linked to a possibly compromised deployer private key.

The protocol's preliminary account places the suspected compromise on an unnamed layer-2 network. The affected key had been used to set minting permissions and create tokens there, Peapods said. PEAS was then bridged to mainnet and sold, according to the team's account.

The provided account does not name the layer-2 network, quantify PEAS minted or sold, disclose transaction hashes, or identify the actor. It also provides no timetable for the post-incident review, recovery results, distribution of recovered assets or a return to normal LP and LVF participation.

Peapods said the withdrawal limited further extraction and that it had contained PEAS selling pressure. For users, the protocol advised a temporary exit from all on-chain liquidity-provider (LP) and LVF positions while the team investigated and pursued recovery.

What happened in Peapods' preliminary account?

Peapods described three stages:

  • The possibly compromised deployer key had been used to set PEAS minting permissions and create tokens on layer 2.
  • PEAS minted on layer 2 was bridged to mainnet.
  • Bridged PEAS was sold on mainnet.

That sequence clarifies the containment effort. Removing layer-2 liquidity targets the pool from which PEAS could still be extracted after bridging. It does not reverse sales already completed on mainnet or establish that every remaining pool has been closed.

What does the mainnet restriction mean?

Peapods said PEAS "cannot be minted directly on mainnet," where only liquidity already bridged from layer 2 can be extracted. Mainnet therefore serves as the exit point for the described incident, not the place where the abnormal PEAS issuance originated.

The provided account reports neither a freeze of bridged assets nor a successful recovery. Peapods' liquidity withdrawal reduces the stated risk on layer 2; it does not restore the PEAS already sold on mainnet.

What changes for users?

The instruction to remove LP and LVF positions is an incident-response measure, not a routine liquidity adjustment. It asks users to unwind exposure tied to the affected on-chain pools while Peapods investigates how the key was compromised and whether assets can be recovered.

The provided statement gives users no guaranteed recovery amount. Nor does Peapods say that withdrawals restore the value of PEAS sold on mainnet. For counterparties, the immediate consequence is a requested unwind of affected positions, with the protocol's review and recovery efforts still pending.

What should the next update establish?

Peapods' post-incident review will need to establish whether all exposure has been contained. The unresolved items in the provided account are:

  • The name of the layer-2 network.
  • The size of the abnormal PEAS issuance.
  • The amount realized through mainnet sales.
  • Whether the deployer key has been secured.

The team also needs to address the practical endpoint for the temporary withdrawal request. Its public account says it is pursuing recovery, but it has not reported recovered funds, a distribution process or a date when normal LP and LVF participation can resume. It has set no public deadline for either restoration or recovery.

Until Peapods completes its post-incident review, the verifiable market-structure change is the removal of 98% to 99% of layer-2 liquidity and the resulting temporary reduction in on-chain LP and LVF activity at the protocol.

via tokenpost.com (Source)

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Daniel Okafor

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Correspondent covering people, launches and day-to-day practice in crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.

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