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SHIELD Blocked About 96% of Binance Theft-Linked Funds at NEAR Intents

NEAR says SHIELD blocked about 96% of Binance theft-linked funds reaching NEAR Intents, but omitted the theft value, date and amount routed through the service.

NEAR Says SHIELD Blocked About 96% of Binance Theft-Linked Funds
WitnessNEAR Says SHIELD Blocked About 96% of Binance Theft-Linked FundsPexels / pixabay

Outputs

  1. NEAR says SHIELD blocked about 96% of Binance theft-linked funds reaching NEAR Intents.

  2. The disclosure omitted the theft’s dollar value, date and share of targeted funds that reached NEAR Intents.

  3. NEAR Intents froze $503,000 linked to a separate Bitget hack.

  4. About $166,000 of the Bitget-linked amount passed through the NEAR Intents swap system.

NEAR said its SHIELD system blocked about 96% of the Binance theft-linked funds that reached NEAR Intents, according to the company’s disclosure.

That figure describes a narrow intervention rate. It does not describe the scale of the theft itself. NEAR Intents is a cross-chain service. It enables swaps between blockchain networks. The 96% applies only to targeted funds entering that service.

The company did not disclose the theft’s dollar value or date. It also did not say how much targeted money reached NEAR Intents. Without that denominator, the percentage cannot be converted into dollars, compared with the total loss or presented as a recovery rate for the wider theft.

For an enforcement claim, those omissions limit the conclusions. “About” makes the result approximate rather than exact. SHIELD blocked most targeted funds reaching the service. That does not mean NEAR recovered, froze or accounted for 96% of everything taken in the Binance-linked incident.

What does SHIELD’s 96% figure establish?

SHIELD is the named control in NEAR’s account. The company did not explain how the system identifies theft-linked assets. It named no blockchains, alert-review process or response time. It also gave no legal authority or process for returning, transferring or adjudicating blocked funds.

Those operational details matter to counterparties assessing the system’s reach. The 96% result applies inside one route. It does not show that the same control works before entry, after exit or across outside services.

The disclosure also omits the chains, token standards, addresses and legal jurisdiction involved, leaving no basis for tracing the remaining funds or attributing the theft to a particular actor.

What does the Bitget freeze show?

In a separate incident, NEAR said NEAR Intents froze $503,000 linked to a Bitget hack. About $166,000 of that amount passed through its swap system, according to the same disclosure.

The cases describe different actions and scopes. The Binance figure is a blocking percentage for assets that reached NEAR Intents. The Bitget case combines a $503,000 freeze linked to the hack with roughly $166,000 that passed through NEAR Intents’ swap system, leaving two distinct figures that should not be merged.

The full $503,000 should not be described as traffic through NEAR Intents. The disclosure supports a narrower statement. About $166,000 of the frozen amount moved through the swap system.

The Bitget disclosure gives no date, jurisdiction, attacker identity or token details. It does not describe the legal basis for the freeze. It says nothing about what happened after the assets were frozen. Nor does it say whether all remain under control.

What does this change for cross-chain swap users?

For users of cross-chain swaps, a service-level control can intercept some hack-linked funds once they arrive. The 96% claim is conditional. The disclosure does not establish that most stolen assets entered the route at all.

The separate freeze suggests another enforcement point inside the same infrastructure. NEAR Intents can hold assets identified as linked to a hack. It can apply even when only part of the associated amount passed through its swap function, making the case an operational intervention rather than evidence of a broader recovery process.

Cross-chain services can become enforcement touchpoints as assets move between networks. Their reach still stops at their own perimeter. Funds that never arrive, or that leave before a control acts, remain outside the reported result.

For counterparties, “96%” is not the only question. They need the missing theft date, total value and inflow amount. They also need evidence that SHIELD performs consistently across cases and chains.

The next enforcement checkpoint is publication of those missing case figures. Until then, the 96% claim cannot be tested against the underlying Binance-linked theft or its full operational scale.

via tokenpost.com (Source)

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Marcus Bennett

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Senior reporter covering money, funding and market shifts around crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.

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