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Telegram Restricts Bot Widgets as Researchers Detail No-Tap Flaw

Telegram has restricted bot widgets after researchers documented no-tap code execution on older clients, while Durov insists the flaw is patched server-side. Here is what each claim actually covers.

Telegram Restricts Bot Widgets Amid Security Dispute
WitnessTelegram Restricts Bot Widgets Amid Security DisputePexels / pixabay

Outputs

  1. Telegram restricted bot widgets after a security dispute; Bot API 10.4 had introduced HTML interfaces in message bubbles with TON wallet integration.

  2. Durov said on Nov. 13 that users had to actively start a third-party service and that the issue is "fully patched server-side."

  3. Researchers' tg-widget-rce archive lists affected versions including Telegram Android 13.2.0, iOS 13.2, Desktop 7.4.0 and macOS 13.1, all fixed in current builds.

  4. Findings distinguish in-app code execution on Android builds 72889 and 72929 from isolated widget-process execution on builds 72979 and 72989; no root or kernel exploit is claimed.

  5. Bybit advised users on Nov. 13 to update Telegram immediately; the exchange reported no customer losses.

Telegram has restricted bot widgets, the HTML mini-interfaces that run inside message bubbles, while founder Pavel Durov disputes the severity of a security flaw described by independent researchers. The restriction closes a new interface for developers building tools and payment flows inside chats, and it lands at the center of a technical dispute over what users of older Telegram clients were actually exposed to.

The stakes are concrete for crypto builders. Telegram's official BotNews announcement for Bot API 10.4 described HTML interfaces running directly in message bubbles, with TON wallet integration for signing transactions, notifying bots of transactions and reading wallet cards, including balances. Those capabilities are not evidence that a security flaw enabled unauthorized transfers. But they explain why the widget channel matters commercially: it is the plumbing for in-chat payments on the TON chain, and any restriction on it narrows the surface developers can build against.

What does Durov's statement actually cover?

Durov said on Nov. 13 that nobody could be hacked simply by receiving a message and that users first had to actively start a third-party service. "Even that is fully patched server-side," he wrote.

The researchers' published archive, tg-widget-rce, describes a more specific trigger. In their account, a bot message carries HTML and JavaScript, and the widget executes when Telegram lays out the message in an open chat — without requiring a tap. Delivery requires a bot permitted to send widgets in the first place. Starting a service and tapping an individual widget are separate actions, which is precisely where the two accounts diverge.

Durov's framing — receive a message, then actively start a service — and the researchers' framing — the widget fires on layout, no tap needed — describe different links in the same chain. Both can be true at once: the server-side patch Durov references may have closed delivery, while the client-side execution the researchers documented concerns what happened before or apart from that fix.

Which versions were affected?

The archive lists affected older app versions:

  • Telegram for Android 13.2.0
  • Telegram for iOS 13.2
  • Telegram Desktop 7.4.0
  • Telegram for macOS 13.1

The researchers say the published flaws are fixed in current Telegram builds.

Their build-specific findings draw an important boundary. They distinguish code execution within the Telegram app itself on older Android builds 72889 and 72929 from results contained in an isolated widget process on builds 72979 and 72989. That is the difference between a compromised app and a compromised sandbox, and it is the line that separates a serious bug from a catastrophe.

The researchers do not claim a root, kernel or bootloader exploit. The findings should not be read as proof of full-device control. On the newest affected builds, execution stayed inside an isolated widget process; on the two older builds, it did not.

What does this change for users who have not updated?

For anyone still running an affected client, the distinction matters in practice. Fixing client code and restricting delivery on Telegram's servers address different parts of the attack path. The archived tests do not establish that older clients remain exploitable under the current server rules, and Durov's statement does not provide a minimum safe version for every client. That leaves a gap: a user on an old build cannot confirm from either account alone whether the server-side restriction fully protects them.

The operational read is straightforward. Update the client, because current builds contain the client-side fixes. The server-side patch may block delivery regardless, but no published material proves that combination is airtight for every version listed.

Exchange response and what follows

Crypto exchange Bybit urged users on Nov. 13 to update Telegram immediately, avoid unfamiliar chats and unknown bots, and not open suspicious links. Its warning that a compromised device could put other apps at risk was an advisory, not a report of customer losses. No customer losses have been reported in connection with the widget findings.

For developers, the near-term consequence is a narrowed interface. Widget-based payment flows and TON wallet integration announced under Bot API 10.4 now operate under tightened delivery rules, and any project that planned user journeys around widgets rendering automatically in open chats should assume that path is closed or gated. Builders relying on in-chat transaction signing will need to verify which widget behaviors still function under the server-side restrictions.

The dispute is unlikely to settle quickly. The researchers' archive is public, build-specific and versioned; Telegram's position rests on server-side controls the company has not detailed to the same granularity. Until Telegram publishes a minimum safe version per client — or demonstrates that server rules neutralize every listed build — practitioners should treat the affected-version list as the working baseline and the current builds as the only confirmed-safe target.

via cryptonews.net (Source)

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Nathan Brooks

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Market editor covering money, funding and market shifts around crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.

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