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User Alleges $4.56M Aster Agent-Key Drain in 44 Minutes
An Aster DEX user says an agent key sold 33 BTC and moved $4.56 million in 44 minutes on Nov. 12. Aster formed an investigation team; key permissions remain disputed.

Outputs
A user alleges agent-key activity moved 4,564,675.50 USDT from an Aster DEX account on Nov. 12.
The posted sequence records 33 BTC sold through 17 market orders.
Seven internal transfers sent the USDT to a newly created account.
The user labels the incident 44 minutes, although the stated timestamps span 46 minutes.
Following the Nov. 12 allegation, Aster said it had formed an investigation team.
By Elena Vasquez
A user of Aster DEX alleges that an agent key moved 4,564,675.50 USDT from an account after 33 BTC were sold through 17 market orders, according to posted account records. The user places the activity on Nov. 12 and characterizes the loss as about $4.56 million over 44 minutes.
The account holder, identified on X by @fuhuahuai (furongfei), said “no transaction was signed” and that the wallet’s private key was not exposed. That claim sits uneasily beside the same account’s reported transfer signatures, which the user attributes to the agent key rather than the main wallet.
Aster’s official account said it had formed an investigation team. The supplied material does not identify the investigators, the access logs they will examine, whether other accounts were affected, or when findings will be released.
How did the alleged transfers occur?
The account places the activity between 11:22 a.m. and 12:08 p.m. ET, or 16:22 and 17:08 UTC, on Nov. 12; the source provides no year. Those timestamps define a 46-minute window, two minutes longer than the claimed 44-minute duration. The discrepancy could reflect the interval between the first and last transaction, but the source does not explain it.
The posted records describe three stages:
- The account sold 33 BTC through 17 market orders.
- Seven internal transfers moved 4,564,675.50 USDT to a newly created account.
- Every transfer reportedly carried a signature from an agent key labeled
@aster-desktop, rather than from the main wallet.
The figures imply 1.94 BTC per market order, about 103,742 USDT per minute and 651,954 USDT per transfer. Those are arithmetic divisions, not independently verified executions.
The source also omits transaction hashes, wallet addresses, the network used for USDT, and token-standard identifiers. It does not establish whether the internal transfers settled on a public blockchain or only through Aster’s ledger. In plain terms, the account alleges tightly timed permission abuse, but the supplied material does not independently establish how the key obtained transfer authority.
What did Aster say about the key?
In written communication, Aster’s CEO described the disputed key as a temporary private key created in the browser after the user authorized wallet access and selected “open trading.” The CEO’s account does not, in the supplied text, explain how the key’s authority was bounded or checked against the options shown during setup.
The account holder says the key’s permissions exceeded the options displayed during setup. That claim puts the focus on permission enforcement rather than merely the creation of a browser key, although the two functions can fail independently.
Leaving the main wallet’s private key concealed does not answer whether a delegated browser key could execute sales and transfers without fresh approval. The source does not report whether the temporary key expired, what permissions it carried, or whether Aster logged its use. Aster’s explanation addresses how the key was created, while the user’s allegation attacks how much authority it could exercise.
What remains unresolved?
The chronology contains unresolved wording. “No transaction was signed” cannot be read literally if the transfers carried agent-key signatures, and the account holder does not expressly limit that statement to main-wallet approvals. Logs and user notices would need to resolve the distinction.
Recovery would also depend on where the assets moved: internal-ledger entries could make account controls decisive, while public settlement would require addresses and transaction hashes for tracing. The source establishes neither settlement path. In practical terms, the next verifiable checkpoint is the investigation team’s findings; the source provides no remediation deadline or announced change to delegated-key controls.
via tokenpost.com (Source)
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Staff writer covering regulation, policy and their impact on crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.
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