XRP Ledger Lending Amendments Fall Short of Validator Threshold

Three proposed amendments to the XRP Ledger received 22, 22 and 23 validator votes on Nov. 12, each short of the 29 needed to begin the two-week approval window. The on-chain snapshot, taken at 3:55 p.m. ET (20:55 UTC), showed 22 of 35 validators supporting LendingProtocol, 22 supporting LendingProtocolV1_1 and 23 supporting SingleAssetVault. The tally has moved only modestly since Oct. 22, when LendingProtocol held 19 votes and SingleAssetVault held 21.

At stake is a structural change to how lending would work on the ledger. The proposal, if activated, would require loan brokers created after activation to operate closed-ended vaults that block both deposits and withdrawals during a preset investment phase. Depositors who cannot exit mid-cycle would remain exposed if borrowers fail to repay.

How would the closed-ended vaults work?

Under LendingProtocolV1_1, each vault would move through three fixed phases: subscription, investment and redemption. Depositors could add or withdraw assets during subscription. Both actions would be disabled during investment, the phase in which assets may be lent out. Withdrawals would resume in redemption, but new deposits and new loans would be barred.

The phase dates would be set at vault creation and could not be revised. That rigidity is the design's core trade-off: it protects the lending book from mid-term runs, but it removes any depositor exit before the scheduled redemption window.

Each vault would hold exactly one asset — XRP, a trust-line token or a Multi-Purpose Token. Depositors would receive shares representing proportional ownership of the pool. Share value could rise with interest income or fall with loan losses. When a loan is made, the principal transfers to the borrower.

What credit protections are actually offered?

Loans under the proposal would be fixed-term and uncollateralized. Borrower screening and credit-risk management would occur off the ledger; the protocol would handle only loan and repayment mechanics. The requested principal, excluding fees, would go to the borrower.

A broker could optionally contribute first-loss capital into the vault, in the same asset, as a cushion against defaults. The proposal is explicit that this contribution would not eliminate credit risk. Under V1.1, interest would be recognized as income only when a borrower actually makes a payment — an accounting choice that avoids booking income that may never arrive.

Vault shares could be configured as transferable or nontransferable. The proposal notes, however, that transferability alone would not guarantee a buyer or a particular sale price — a caveat that matters for any depositor expecting a secondary-market exit.

What survives if the amendments activate?

The changes would not be retroactive. Brokers formed before activation could continue lending from open-ended vaults, and vaults created under the earlier accounting model would retain that model. The two-week support requirement applies to each amendment individually: 29 votes first, then sustained support for fourteen days.

If validator backing does not grow beyond the current 22-23 range, none of the three amendments enters the approval window, and the closed-ended broker model remains a proposal rather than protocol law. The next measurable checkpoint is whether the count moves before support periods can even begin.