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Zcash Holders to Vote on Moving 50,000 ZEC Into Mining Reserve
A co-founders' draft dated October 29, 2026 would move 50,000 ZEC from ZCG into a ZIP 237 mining reserve and end its 8% block-reward share after NU7.

Outputs
Draft dated October 29, 2026 proposes transferring 50,000 ZEC from ZCG into the NSM under ZIP 237.
ZCG holds ~91,453 ZEC and ~$8.8M cash against ~$2.4M in grant liabilities; ~144 ZEC daily inflow would end after NU7.
The 8% block-reward share would redirect to a locked 'Future Dev and Legal Defense Fund' requiring separate spending proposals.
ZCG withdrew its own ~98,000 ZEC plan on November 3, 2026 after community criticism.
The draft has no ZIP number and no activation schedule; it depends on the NU7 upgrade shipping.
Zcash holders will vote on a draft proposal to transfer 50,000 ZEC from the Zcash Community Grants treasury into the Network Sustainability Mechanism (NSM), a slow-release reserve that pays the funds back to miners block by block. The draft, dated October 29, 2026, was authored by the protocol's co-founders and also ends ZCG's automatic 8% slice of block rewards once the NU7 network upgrade ships. Neither a ZIP number nor an activation schedule exists yet — a caveat worth attaching to every promise in the document.
The 50,000 ZEC would not be burned and would not fall under a new committee's control. Under ZIP 237, the NSM holds ZEC and releases it gradually into mining rewards over time. In plain terms, the grants treasury's stockpile would be parked in a mechanism that drips it back into the mining economy.
Where would the 8% stream go instead?
The draft redirects the 8% block-reward share, currently ZCG's core income, into a new locked pool named the "Future Dev and Legal Defense Fund." Any spending from that fund would require its own proposal. The name itself signals intent: the authors want capital earmarked for both engineering and potential legal costs, rather than routed through a single grants process.
What do the treasury numbers show?
ZCG currently holds approximately 91,453 ZEC and roughly $8.8 million in cash, against about $2.4 million in outstanding grant liabilities already committed to grantees. A successful transfer would leave the committee with an estimated 41,453 ZEC.
The income side is the harder constraint. ZCG takes in about 144 ZEC per day from its block-reward share — roughly 52,500 ZEC per year. The proposed 50,000 ZEC transfer equals just under one year of that inflow. After NU7, the tap closes entirely.
The arithmetic leaves room to honor existing commitments. It does not leave room for a self-replenishing program: every future grant would draw from a pool that no longer refills.
Why is this a governance fight with history?
This proposal did not emerge in isolation. ZCG had floated its own plan involving approximately 98,000 ZEC and withdrew it on November 3, 2026, after community criticism. The co-founders' draft, dated five days earlier, effectively competes with that withdrawn vision for control of the treasury and the 8% stream.
The committee is being asked to surrender both a large share of its stockpile and the mechanism that rebuilds it. That double demand explains the friction.
What has to happen before any of this takes effect?
Three gates stand between draft and reality:
- A formal ZIP number must be assigned.
- Broad community support must materialize beyond the vote itself.
- The NU7 network upgrade must ship.
None of these has a date attached. The draft remains formally unfinished, and its authors have not published an activation schedule.
What does this mean for builders?
Grantees face a committee with an estimated 41,453 ZEC plus $8.8 million in cash, against $2.4 million in existing liabilities. Current commitments appear coverable. Future applicants face a shrinking, non-replenishing pool, unless the new Future Dev and Legal Defense Fund — which requires separate proposals for any payout — picks up the slack.
What is not said matters here: the draft specifies no funding formula for the new fund, no governance process for its proposals, and no backstop if ZCG's residual treasury runs dry.
In plain words: holders are voting on whether to convert a refilling grants program into a finite pool, with the difference drip-fed to miners.
via cryptonews.net (Source)
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Staff writer covering regulation, policy and their impact on crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.
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