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64,000 Bitcoin miners redirected in Luxor Commander breach
CoreX Hosting says about 64,000 miners and 13 EH/s were redirected to OCEAN after attackers exploited Luxor’s Commander software. No block was mined, and Luxor promised full compensation.

Outputs
November 15: Luxor confirmed that attackers exploited a vulnerability in its Commander mining software.
CoreX Hosting reported that about 64,000 miners and 13 EH/s were redirected to OCEAN.
The attacked hash rate fell to 100 PH/s; OCEAN reached 48.8 EH/s before returning to about 40 EH/s.
The attacker mined no Bitcoin block and received no reward, while affected miners lost unrecoverable mining time.
Luxor patched Commander in two hours; the broader restoration reportedly took six hours, and more than a dozen clients were affected.
Attackers redirected about 64,000 Bitcoin miners using 13 EH/s of hash rate to the OCEAN mining pool through a vulnerability in Luxor Technology’s Commander software, according to CoreX Hosting.
Luxor confirmed the incident on November 15. The company wrote: “Affected machines were pointed to a different pool for a limited window.” Nothing had physically failed on the miners. The weak point sat in the software that managed them.
The breach moved 13 EH/s
CoreX Hosting said the altered configuration sent the miners’ computing power to OCEAN and assigned their payouts to an attacker’s Bitcoin address without authorization. Customers discovered that their pool information had changed without their knowledge.
The report said an X post believed a group similar to one behind HiveON’s compromise a few days earlier had carried out the attack. That was an assessment based on similarities between the incidents, not a confirmed identification of the attacker.
As the redirection continued, the attacked hash rate fell to 100 PH/s. OCEAN’s hash rate spiked to 48.8 EH/s before returning to around 40 EH/s. Those shifts show the scale and temporary nature of the diversion.
The attacker did not mine a Bitcoin block and received no reward. The miners still lost the opportunity to earn, because their hashing time could not be recovered. The practical loss was foregone mining revenue, not block rewards paid to the attacker.
Luxor patched the flaw and promised compensation
Luxor’s on-call engineering team began responding as soon as the company identified the compromise. The team patched the Commander vulnerability in two hours. The report said some observers treated that fix as an emergency patch, while some said the broader restoration took six hours.
Luxor reported no data leakage, but more than a dozen clients were affected. The company then made the financial terms explicit: “Every affected client will be paid in full for the redirected hashrate, as if it had mined normally.”
That promise addresses the revenue affected clients lost during the diversion. It does not change the fact that the redirected work produced no Bitcoin block or attacker reward. Luxor said Commander was operating normally and users did not need to take action.
The company also said Luxor Pool and LuxOS were not affected. By the time of the report, operations had been restored. Luxor’s restored service and compensation pledge could rebuild confidence; some users described the response as not bad at all.
What does this change for mining operators?
It changes where the operational risk sits. A compromise in management software can redirect thousands of miners without tampering with the rigs, turning pool settings into a direct control over customers’ earnings.
For pool operators, the practical lesson is to treat management software and routing controls as core infrastructure. Their security failures can create immediate, aggregate losses across client fleets, even when every physical machine remains in working order.
For miners, the immediate loss was unrecoverable mining time. Compensation may settle the financial claim with affected clients, but trust will depend on customers believing that pool settings can no longer be altered without authorization. That concern extends beyond Luxor because the report linked the incident to the earlier HiveON compromise through its management-software similarities.
Security before fee-only mining
The report also cited an expectation that the last Bitcoin would be mined around 2140. After that point, miners would earn transaction fees rather than new Bitcoin. It argued that demand for Bitcoin miners would remain high, making stronger safeguards across mining-management infrastructure more urgent.
Before mining shifts toward fee-only rewards around 2140, Luxor’s credibility will depend on verifiable pool configurations and full payment of the promised compensation.
via ambcrypto.com (Source)
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Senior reporter covering money, funding and market shifts around crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.
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