0x42ae98a942ae…42ae98a6

ConfirmedSecurity400 vB175 sat/vB2 min decode

Blockaid: MORE Protocol Exploit Drains About $308,000 in WFLOW

Blockaid says a flash-loan exploit on MORE, a DeFi protocol on Flow EVM, drained about $308,000 from its WFLOW reserve across roughly 10 transactions, with transfers still ongoing.

Blockaid Says MORE Exploit Drained About $308,000 From WFLOW Reserve
WitnessBlockaid Says MORE Exploit Drained About $308,000 From WFLOW Reservegeralt / pixabay

Outputs

  1. Blockaid reported about $308,000 drained from MORE's WFLOW reserve

  2. The attack involved roughly 10 transactions and remained active at disclosure

  3. The attacker used a flash loan to trigger self-liquidation of an ankrFLOW/WFLOW e-mode position

  4. The resulting unbacked WFLOW debt was linked to withdrawals from the reserve pool

Blockchain security firm Blockaid reported that an exploit against MORE, a decentralized finance protocol on Flow EVM, moved roughly $308,000 out of its WFLOW reserve. The firm counted about 10 transactions in the drain and said the attack was still active at the time it disclosed the incident.

The figure is approximate. Blockaid described it as the approximate WFLOW value transferred in the observed activity, and the transaction count carries the same caveat. Neither the protocol nor an independent auditor had confirmed a final loss number when the disclosure went out.

How did the attack work?

The mechanics matter here, because they explain how a reserve pool ends up funding an attacker's exit. Blockaid linked the withdrawals to a single lending position on MORE. That position paired ankrFLOW against WFLOW and ran in e-mode, the higher-efficiency collateral configuration that lets closely correlated assets back each other with tighter parameters.

The attacker opened with a flash loan. The borrowed capital was used to force the position into self-liquidation. That maneuver left the account carrying WFLOW debt without sufficient collateral standing behind it. In other words, the position became insolvent by design, and the shortfall landed on the protocol.

The bad debt is the bridge to the stolen funds. Once the position owed more than it held, Blockaid connected that unbacked WFLOW debt directly to withdrawals from MORE's reserve pool. The sequence ran in one direction: flash loan, self-liquidation, bad debt, then withdrawals. Roughly 10 transactions moved the funds out.

What does this change for MORE and Flow EVM?

For MORE, the immediate operational question is whether the WFLOW reserve can be frozen or drained faster than the attacker can iterate. Blockaid's warning that transfers were continuing at disclosure means the $308,000 figure was a floor, not a total. Protocols in this situation typically pause the affected market, but the source disclosure did not say MORE had done so.

For Flow EVM more broadly, the incident is a stress test of its young DeFi layer. E-mode positions concentrate risk in correlated assets like ankrFLOW and WFLOW. When that correlation assumption breaks under a flash-loan attack, the efficiency gains become the attack surface.

The exploit window is the story to watch now. Until MORE confirms the position is closed and the reserve secured, every additional block is a chance for further withdrawals.

via tokenpost.com (Source)

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Marcus Bennett

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Senior reporter covering money, funding and market shifts around crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.

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