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At Least 186 Sites Hit in Suspected Optimizely Supply-Chain Attack

Security researcher Scott Helme identified at least 186 websites as affected by OPTIMJACK, a suspected Optimizely supply-chain attack replacing copied crypto addresses and targeting payment-card data.

Suspected Optimizely Supply-Chain Attack Hits at Least 186 Sites
WitnessSuspected Optimizely Supply-Chain Attack Hits at Least 186 SitesJoshuaWoroniecki / pixabay

Outputs

  1. At least 186 websites were identified as affected by OPTIMJACK.

  2. The suspected supply-chain attack involves Optimizely, a website A/B-testing provider.

  3. Malicious JavaScript replaces copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled addresses.

  4. The script also attempts to steal payment-card information.

  5. CNN, Zoom, BBC, Fox News, Salesforce and GitLab were named among affected sites.

At least 186 websites were exposed to malicious JavaScript through a suspected supply-chain attack involving Optimizely, according to security researcher Scott Helme, who identified the affected sites under the name OPTIMJACK.

Optimizely provides website A/B-testing services. In the reported campaign, contaminated JavaScript changed a cryptocurrency wallet address when a visitor copied it and attempted to collect payment-card information.

The core crypto mechanism targets a routine user action. Attackers controlled the replacement address, so a transfer made from the altered text could send funds to a recipient other than the one the visitor intended. The substitution occurred at the copy step, before the user had an opportunity to compare the pasted address with the original.

This timing gives the attack a narrow but consequential injection point. A visitor can begin on a familiar site, copy an address that appears to come from a trusted page and place the substituted text into a transfer interface. The resulting destination would already differ from the intended one, even if the user saw no suspicious link or warning.

The campaign also seeks payment-card information, extending potential exposure beyond crypto holders. The script therefore presents two distinct risks to visitors of affected pages: fraudulent redirection of copied wallet addresses and attempted theft of card details. Neither risk requires the user to leave the named site to encounter the reported malicious script.

Helme's list includes CNN, Zoom, BBC, Fox News, Salesforce and GitLab. Their inclusion places multiple established online properties inside the same reported exposure set, although the account does not specify the mechanism by which the script reached each site or whether every visitor encountered it.

The campaign was described as ongoing, with malicious scripts still posing a risk on sites where they loaded. That status matters for containment: resolving one mistaken transfer destination would not establish that the injected code had been removed, while leaving the script active preserves both the wallet-substitution and payment-card collection paths.

For users, the attack changes the verification sequence. A wallet address copied from a webpage should be checked against the page's visible original before funds are sent, rather than trusted solely because it came from a well-known domain. Users should also avoid entering card information on an affected property until operators confirm removal of the malicious script.

For website operators, the episode shows why third-party code requires verification as an active operational dependency rather than a passive analytics layer. A compromised script can inherit the trust of the host site and act at the moment a visitor copies information, making domain reputation an inadequate substitute for checking what the page actually loads.

The reported consequences remain potential rather than fully quantified. The source gives no confirmed theft total, wallet count, number of payment-card records taken, or financial loss at any of the six named sites. It also does not identify a token standard or blockchain, so the disclosure should not be read as evidence that one particular digital asset network was compromised.

Attribution carries a similar qualifier. The incident is described as a suspected supply-chain attack involving Optimizely, not a conclusively documented compromise of the company's platform. The available account does not identify the initial intrusion point, affected product versions or a remediation timetable, and it does not provide a final count beyond the minimum of 186 websites.

What does this change for website operators and users?

For operators, the immediate task is to establish whether malicious code remains on each property and whether it retains access to copied wallet text and payment-card fields. Because the six publicized names are examples from a set of at least 186, they should not be treated as a complete list of properties requiring checks.

For users, the six named sites should not be treated as a complete blocklist either. The wider lesson is narrower: verify a copied crypto address at the source and destination, and withhold card details from any page that operators have not confirmed is clean. That advice matters most while the campaign remains described as ongoing.

With no remediation deadline disclosed, the relevant forward marker is verified removal of the malicious script across affected properties; until that status is confirmed, the reported exposure window remains open.

via tokenpost.com (Source)

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Nathan Brooks

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Market editor covering money, funding and market shifts around crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.

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