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Brookings: Stablecoins could drive $2.3 trillion in T-bill demand by 2030

Brookings analysis estimates stablecoin-driven Treasury bill demand between $400B and $2.3T by 2030, depending on whether growth draws from overseas or substitutes existing cash-equivalent vehicles.

Outputs

  1. Stablecoin market totaled approximately $270 billion as of June 2026

  2. Net new Treasury bill demand by 2030 estimated at $400 billion to $2.3 trillion

  3. GENIUS Act signed into law by President Donald Trump on July 18, 2025

  4. Brookings paper published August 19, 2026, by Nellie Liang and Brent Neiman

  5. Authors recommend retaining the prohibition on paying interest on stablecoins initially

A new Brookings Institution analysis estimates that widespread stablecoin adoption could generate between $400 billion and $2.3 trillion in net new demand for U.S. Treasury bills by 2030, depending on whether growth draws primarily from overseas users or substitutes domestic cash-equivalent vehicles.

The paper, published August 19, 2026, is authored by Nellie Liang of the Brookings Hutchins Center and Brent Neiman of the University of Chicago. It arrives roughly one year after President Donald Trump signed the GENIUS Act into law on July 18, 2025, creating the first comprehensive federal framework for payment stablecoins.

How large could stablecoin demand for Treasuries become?

Liang and Neiman modeled several scenarios for stablecoin adoption using private-sector forecasts. Under those scenarios, net new Treasury bill demand by 2030 ranges from $400 billion to $2.3 trillion. The wide band reflects one structural variable: where growth comes from.

If stablecoins primarily capture demand from abroad, net new T-bill demand rises sharply. If stablecoins instead substitute for money market mutual funds, those funds sell existing Treasury holdings to meet redemptions, dampening net new demand. The authors released an accompanying online tool that applies alternative adoption assumptions to that calculation.

What does the GENIUS Act actually require?

The 2025 law mandates that issuers back stablecoins at least one-for-one with eligible reserves, including Treasury bills, cash, and certain short-dated obligations. It sets out a framework for issuance, redemption, and compliance with anti-money-laundering and sanctions rules.

As of June 2026, the total stablecoin market stood at approximately $270 billion, according to the paper.

What are the payments case and the dollar dominance argument?

The authors argue stablecoins can settle nearly instantly, around the clock, and can be programmed through smart contracts to automate transactions that today require manual processing. They contend the dollar's international role would benefit if a widely available digital dollar keeps pace with central bank digital currencies and fast payment systems being built abroad.

The paper flags a parallel concern. If stablecoins reduce reliance on correspondent banking, U.S. authorities may lose leverage they now use to enforce sanctions and anti-money-laundering rules. Liang and Neiman recommend regulators require issuers and wallet providers to deploy compliance systems capable of blocking illicit transactions and cooperating rapidly with law enforcement.

What tradeoffs do regulators need to manage?

The paper identifies several. First, capital and liquidity rules must ensure stablecoins convert to dollars on demand at any time, with higher capital for reserves held in uninsured bank deposits than in Treasuries or cash. Second, the sector currently lacks consumer protections common to traditional payment systems: dispute resolution, fraud recovery, and guaranteed settlement finality.

Third, larger T-bill demand shortens the average maturity of federal debt, exposing taxpayers to more frequent refinancing and greater variability in interest costs. Stablecoins could also reduce seigniorage revenue if they displace physical cash, the authors add, and could shrink credit to small businesses if deposits migrate from community banks to stablecoin issuers.

What do Liang and Neiman recommend?

The authors suggest the Treasury Department incorporate stablecoin demand into its debt management strategy and assess how additional T-bill appetite should influence the maturity structure of federal borrowing. They recommend retaining the current prohibition on paying interest on stablecoins, at least initially, to slow potentially disruptive deposit shifts until regulators gain more experience with the new market.

The paper closes with a longer-term question: as privately issued digital money scales, the policy choices made during GENIUS Act implementation will play an important role in determining whether stablecoins become a durable complement to the existing monetary system or introduce new risks that outweigh their promise.

What implementation deadlines should markets watch?

Agency rulemaking under the GENIUS Act is still pending, with capital, liquidity, and compliance standards for issuers due in phases over 2026 and 2027, a window that will set the operating floor for new entrants and determine how quickly bank and fintech competitors can scale tokenized payment infrastructure.

via brookings.edu (Original)

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