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IOSCO Warns Blockchains Face Hardest Path to Quantum Safety
IOSCO's 63-page report says quantum computers able to break market cryptography may arrive 2030-2035, and blockchains will migrate slowest — hard forks, 2,420-byte signatures and 6 million exposed BTC complicate the path.

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IOSCO's 63-page report estimates quantum computers able to break current cryptography could emerge between 2030 and 2035.
NIST's ML-DSA-44 post-quantum signatures are roughly 2,420 bytes, 35-40 times larger than today's 64-byte elliptic curve signatures.
A quantum-resistant Solana testnet saw throughput fall about 90% after switching to post-quantum signatures.
Roughly 6 million BTC sit in quantum-exposed addresses, per a crypto industry alliance cited in the report.
IOSCO will treat quantum readiness as a priority area in 2027.
Securities regulators worldwide have told financial markets, including crypto firms, to begin migrating off today's public-key cryptography now, because quantum computers capable of breaking it could arrive between 2030 and 2035. In a 63-page report published Thursday, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) warned that blockchains in particular face the heaviest migration burden in finance.
The cyber readiness challenge posed by quantum computing "is immediate and requires action," IOSCO said. The report flagged one scenario with a name already current among developers: "Q-Day," when a sufficiently capable quantum computer derives private keys from the exposed public keys that networks such as Ethereum, Solana and Tron rely on for elliptic curve cryptography.
What did IOSCO actually say?
"Practical quantum computers capable of compromising widely used cryptography do not yet exist, but the scale and duration of the transition mean the financial sector should start preparing today," IOSCO Board Chair Jean-Paul Servais said in a statement. The gap between the warning and the threat is the story here: the machines are not real yet, but the remediation is measured in years.
The 2030-2035 window is the conservative estimate. Several industry participants consulted by IOSCO pushed for a tighter timeline, arguing firms should prepare for arrival within five years, potentially accelerated by AI. That disagreement is unresolved, and it sets the pace of spending across the sector.
The report drew on a March 2026 survey of members of IOSCO's Fintech Task Force. No surveyed jurisdiction reported operational quantum computing deployment in regulated financial services — a useful reminder that the risk is prospective, not present.
Why are blockchains the hard case?
Cryptography sits inside transaction formats and consensus rules. Changing it requires hard forks, and decentralized networks have no mechanism to force rapid adoption, making migration "slow and fragmented" in IOSCO's words.
The cost is measurable. Signatures under ML-DSA-44, a post-quantum standard from the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology, run about 2,420 bytes — roughly 35 to 40 times larger than the 64-byte elliptic curve signatures in use today. The report cited a quantum-resistant Solana testnet where throughput fell by about 90% after post-quantum signatures replaced existing ones. For networks that monetize block space and settlement speed, that is an operational problem, not a cosmetic one.
The exposure does not end at upgrade time. Accounts and smart contracts still controlled by vulnerable keys could remain exposed even after a network adds quantum-resistant options. Roughly 6 million BTC sit in exposed addresses, according to a crypto industry alliance formed on the issue. Bitcoin developer Cory Fields has proposed "quantum landmines" to make attacking dormant coins costly, since holders of abandoned coins cannot move them.
What about wallets and layer-2s?
Wallet makers face a trade-off between size and safety. SHRINCS, the leading candidate for a post-quantum Bitcoin signature scheme, uses "stateful" signatures roughly 10 times smaller — but reusing keys beyond a set signing budget can expose funds to theft, Trezor CTO Tomáš Sušánka has said. Trezor is weighing whether to make the larger, stateless option the default, and hardware wallets will also need post-quantum cryptography for firmware and device authentication, he added.
Layer-2 networks inherit the problem. Optimistic rollups could face forged signatures during their dispute windows, typically seven days on Ethereum. Many zero-knowledge rollups use SNARK proofs built on elliptic curves; hash-based STARK proofs are more resistant. A rollup, however, is only as safe as the layer-1 contracts, bridges and governance keys beneath it.
Developers are not idle. Researchers have proposed multiple routes to quantum-safe Bitcoin, StarkWare has demonstrated a quantum-safe Bitcoin transaction, and Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin has said the network is betting its future on quantum resistance. Demonstrations, though, are not deployments; no major network has completed the migration.
IOSCO also distinguished "on-spend" attacks, where an attacker races to exploit a public key revealed by a pending transaction, from "at-rest" attacks on keys left exposed indefinitely. Most market preparations remain at an early stage, the report found — awareness, governance, training, system inventories. Some respondents described "quantum-procrastination": firms delaying action while waiting for clearer regulatory signals.
IOSCO urged regulators to act against "quantum washing," where firms overstate the maturity or performance of quantum technology, and said it will treat quantum as a priority in 2027, focused on raising awareness across the financial ecosystem. That gives firms a de facto window of roughly two years to move from inventories to migration plans before regulator attention sharpens.
via google.com (Original)
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Staff writer covering regulation, policy and their impact on crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.
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