0x79ebde4f79eb…79ebde4c

ConfirmedSecurity655 vB139 sat/vB3 min decode

Safe Says $6.44M Outflow Affected One Multisig Wallet

Safe says a $6.44 million outflow hit one multisig through a Zodiac Roles Modifier. No owner signed it; the Safe{Wallet} app and core contracts remained unaffected.

Safe Says $6.44 Million Outflow Affected One Multisig Wallet
WitnessSafe Says $6.44 Million Outflow Affected One Multisig Walletstevepb / pixabay

Outputs

  1. About $6.44 million left one Safe multisig at 6:35 a.m. ET on Monday.

  2. The transfer included about 4.39 million USDC and 1.72 million syrupUSDC.

  3. The 1.72 million syrupUSDC was valued at about $2.05 million shortly before the transfer.

  4. Safe said no owner signed the transfer; its contracts and Safe{Wallet} app were unaffected.

  5. Zodiac said it found no flaw in its contracts; one role member’s key was probably compromised.

By Marcus Bennett

$6.44 million left one Safe multisig at 6:35 a.m. ET on Monday, according to Safe, which said no owner signed the transfer.

The money moved through a Zodiac Roles Modifier. Safe said its contracts and the Safe{Wallet} app were unaffected.

About 4.39 million USD Coin (USDC) left a Morpho lending vault. The same transaction sent roughly 1.72 million syrupUSDC to one address.

The syrupUSDC was valued at about $2.05 million at a price recorded minutes before the transfer. Together, the two token positions made up the reported outflow.

Safe said: “no owner signed it.” The company also said the affected module had been installed outside Safe{Wallet}.

What moved the funds?

Zodiac said it found “no flaw in its contracts.” Its review instead pointed to a role member’s key that was probably compromised.

The wallet’s custom policy allowed the transaction. Zodiac said that policy was likely unintended, even though its rules permitted the transfer to proceed.

That combination matters. A compromised role member appears to have provided the access, while the wallet’s policy determined that no owner signature was required for this movement.

Safe’s account separates the incident from a failure of its core software. The loss involved one multisig, an externally installed module and a custom policy, rather than the Safe{Wallet} app or Safe’s contracts.

The practical question is how a wallet that requires multiple owners could lose funds without one owner approving the transaction. According to Safe and Zodiac, the answer lies in the module’s role and the policy governing it.

What does this change for Safe users?

For Safe users, the immediate distinction is scope. One multisig was affected, and Safe reported no impact to its contracts or app. The outflow did not require a flaw in Zodiac’s contract code, according to Zodiac.

For operators, module placement now matters as a control separate from the core wallet. A module installed outside Safe{Wallet} can bring role and policy conditions that the app itself does not govern.

That does not mean every Safe deployment carries the same exposure. Safe and Zodiac described one affected multisig, one role member’s key and one custom policy. They provided no wider count of wallets using the same arrangement.

Still, the sequence offers a clear operational lesson. Permissions assigned to external modules need to account for what happens when a role member’s key is compromised and a policy permits a transfer without owner approval.

Zodiac’s review places the likely failure at the key-and-policy layer. Safe’s report places the affected software outside Safe{Wallet}. Together, those boundaries explain why the loss did not require an owner signature or a defect in the core contracts.

For end users, the question is not whether Safe’s app was compromised, because Safe said it was not. The question is whether the multisig’s external module and custom policy created a path around its owner checks.

What comes next?

The open operational question is whether the same module-and-policy combination could allow withdrawals from other multisigs without owner approval. Any broader assessment would depend on the key’s exposure and the reach of the custom policy.

Neither company reported broader effects on Safe’s core software, so any wider conclusion would go beyond the current findings across deployments or wallet configurations.

The immediate structural issue is plain. External modules can operate apart from the wallet app, and their policies can sit between a compromised role member and a loss of funds.

The next step for operators is to review how modules are installed, which keys can authorize movement, and whether a custom policy removes the need for owner approval.

Going forward, external-module permissions and owner checks will be the structural fault line to watch, because the module sat outside the app and its policy allowed the transfer.

via tokenpost.com (Source)

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Marcus Bennett

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Senior reporter covering money, funding and market shifts around crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.

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