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ZachXBT Accuses CoinJoin Operator Kruw of Laundering for Lazarus

ZachXBT claims Kruw knowingly laundered Lazarus Group funds, calling the North Korea-linked hackers the CoinJoin operator's largest user, citing exploits worth hundreds of millions.

ZachXBT accuses CoinJoin operator Kruw of laundering funds for Lazarus Group
WitnessZachXBT accuses CoinJoin operator Kruw of laundering funds for Lazarus Groupgeralt / pixabay

Outputs

  1. ZachXBT alleged on November 17, 2026 that Kruw's largest user is the Lazarus Group

  2. A June 2025 US Secret Service alert linked Kruw.io to roughly $1B in Lazarus laundering proceeds

  3. Arkham traced 2,173.76 BTC (~$154.45M) from the $387M Bitget hack into CoinJoin

  4. ZachXBT's earlier Bybit work led Tether to freeze approximately 442,000 USDT

  5. Kruw self-reports 1.6% of Bitcoin blockspace; ZachXBT disputed the figure

On-chain investigator ZachXBT has accused CoinJoin operator Kruw of knowingly helping the Lazarus Group launder proceeds from major crypto exploits, claiming the North Korea-linked hacking group is the service's single largest user.

The allegation landed on November 17, 2026. ZachXBT's sharpest claim goes beyond incidental exposure: he contends Kruw knowingly facilitated laundering tied to hundreds of millions of dollars across several exploits, not that criminals simply happened to use open infrastructure.

What exactly is being alleged?

ZachXBT says Kruw enabled Lazarus to move stolen crypto through its CoinJoin service. CoinJoin is a Bitcoin privacy technique: several users combine their coins into a single transaction, making it much harder for outside observers to trace any one participant's funds.

Kruw has advertised its own scale, self-reporting that its CoinJoin transactions account for 1.6% of Bitcoin's blockspace. ZachXBT contested that figure. If the number is inflated, or if a substantial share of the volume traces back to illicit flows, the operator's claim to legitimacy as a mainstream privacy tool weakens considerably.

What trail sits behind the claims?

Kruw's name has surfaced alongside Lazarus before. A June 2025 alert from the US Secret Service linked Kruw.io to Lazarus laundering activity. That alert reportedly concerned around $1 billion in proceeds from various exploits, including the Bybit hack — a theft of approximately $1.5 billion in February 2025.

On-chain analytics firm Arkham Intelligence added a data point on a separate incident: 2,173.76 BTC, roughly $154.45 million, flowing into CoinJoin from wallets connected to the $387 million Bitget hack of September 2025.

ZachXBT has worked this beat for a while. In an earlier investigation, he identified Bybit-linked wallets holding more than $12 million, work that led Tether to freeze approximately 442,000 USDT. His earlier reporting also detailed links between a money laundering syndicate and Lazarus, describing more than $1 billion in illicit funds moving through laundering processes tied to major incidents, Bybit included.

Why does 'knowledge' matter legally?

The distinction cuts to the core of the case. Operators like Kruw can argue they run neutral infrastructure available to anyone who wants financial privacy. Running open software that criminals happen to use is one thing. Knowingly serving a state-linked hacking group is a very different matter, both ethically and legally.

ZachXBT's allegation is precisely that Kruw knew exactly who its biggest customer was. That framing shifts the question from one of technology policy to one of intent, and it's the framing regulators and prosecutors tend to build cases around.

None of ZachXBT's claims have been proven in court. They are allegations from an independent investigator — though one whose past work has produced concrete results, including the Tether freeze.

What does this mean for Kruw and the market?

The most immediate stakes fall on Kruw itself. A prior Secret Service alert plus a public accusation from a high-profile investigator is a difficult combination for any operator to shake off, regardless of eventual legal outcomes.

For exchanges and stablecoin issuers, the Bybit case offers the operative lesson. Funds that pass through CoinJoin still have to land somewhere eventually. Those exit points — where freezes like the 442,000 USDT action happen — may prove to be where investigators make the most progress.

What happens next?

Three things are worth watching: whether Kruw responds to the allegations in detail, whether law enforcement builds on the Secret Service's earlier alert, and whether further on-chain analysis, like Arkham's work on the Bitget funds, connects additional stolen coins to the service.

If more exploited funds are tied to Kruw's CoinJoin flows, the operator's 1.6% blockspace claim stops being a marketing asset and becomes a liability — a measurable footprint for investigators to work against.

via Crypto Briefing (Source)

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Daniel Okafor

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Correspondent covering people, launches and day-to-day practice in crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.

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