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ZachXBT Alleges CoinJoin Operator Kruw Laundered for Lazarus Group
ZachXBT accuses CoinJoin operator Kruw of knowingly laundering Lazarus Group funds tied to the $1.5B Bybit and $387M Bitget hacks, after a June 2025 Secret Service alert.

Outputs
ZachXBT alleges CoinJoin operator Kruw knowingly served Lazarus Group, the North Korea-linked hacking collective
A June 2025 US Secret Service alert linked Kruw.io to roughly $1B in Lazarus laundering proceeds, including the $1.5B Bybit hack
Arkham Intelligence traced 2,173.76 BTC (~$154.45M) from the $387M September 2025 Bitget hack into CoinJoin
ZachXBT's earlier Bybit work led Tether to freeze approximately 442,000 USDT
Kruw self-reports 1.6% of Bitcoin blockspace from its CoinJoin transactions; ZachXBT disputes the figure
Blockchain investigator ZachXBT has publicly accused CoinJoin operator Kruw of knowingly processing funds for Lazarus Group, the North Korea-linked hacking collective. The allegation follows a June 2025 US Secret Service alert that already tied Kruw.io to Lazarus laundering activity covering roughly $1 billion in exploit proceeds. None of the claims have been tested in court, and Kruw has not, so far, offered a detailed rebuttal.
What does the accusation actually say?
CoinJoin is a Bitcoin privacy technique. Several users merge coins into a single transaction, making it harder for outside observers to trace which funds belong to whom. Operators typically defend themselves as neutral infrastructure — software anyone may use, for any reason.
ZachXBT's claim cuts through that defense. He alleges Kruw knew the identity of its largest customer. The distinction matters: running open software that criminals happen to use is one legal posture; knowingly serving a state-linked hacking group invites a far graver one. The investigator, notably, did not publish evidence proving that knowledge, at least not in the material disclosed so far.
His track record lends weight to the accusation regardless. In earlier work on the Bybit hack, ZachXBT identified exchange-linked wallets holding more than $12 million, and that reporting prompted Tether to freeze approximately 442,000 USDT — roughly $442,000 at par. A separate investigation by the same researcher documented more than $1 billion in illicit funds moving through laundering channels connected to major incidents, including Bybit.
How large are the flows involved?
The figures are substantial by any frame. The Bybit hack of February 2025 extracted approximately $1.5 billion — for perspective, more than the annual budget of several small national cybersecurity agencies.
Arkham Intelligence, a separate on-chain analytics firm, traced 2,173.76 BTC — roughly $154.45 million at prevailing prices — flowing from wallets connected to the $387 million Bitget hack of September 2025 into CoinJoin. That figure represents about 40% of the total stolen in that incident, if the attribution holds.
Then there is the scale question. Kruw self-reports that its CoinJoin transactions account for 1.6% of all Bitcoin blockspace. ZachXBT disputes that figure. If the number is inflated, or if a large share of genuine volume traces to illicit flows, the operator's claim to legitimacy as a mainstream privacy tool weakens considerably. Kruw has not published independent verification of the statistic, which is itself telling.
In plain words: an operator facing both a federal alert and a high-profile public accusation has an unusually steep hill to climb.
What has not been proven?
The record contains allegations, not verdicts. ZachXBT is an independent investigator, albeit one whose prior work has produced concrete enforcement outcomes such as the Tether freeze. The Secret Service alert was reportedly about proceeds from various exploits; the precise evidentiary basis connecting Kruw's operators to Lazarus remains undisclosed.
Kruw has not responded to the allegations in detail. Until it does, or until law enforcement acts on the June 2025 alert, the accusation stands as an unproven but documented chain: federal alert first, independent on-chain analysis second.
Where do investigators go from here?
The Bybit precedent suggests the exit points, not the mixer itself, are where enforcement bites. Funds that pass through CoinJoin must eventually land somewhere, and those landing points are where freezes — such as the 442,000 USDT action — become possible.
Three developments will define the story's next phase: whether Kruw issues a substantive response, whether law enforcement builds on its earlier alert, and whether further on-chain analysis connects additional stolen coins to the service. For exchanges and stablecoin issuers, the operational lesson is already clear — monitoring CoinJoin exit flows may matter more than monitoring the joins.
Watch for any follow-on enforcement action tied to the Secret Service alert; that, rather than the accusation itself, would convert an investigator's claim into a legal case.
via cryptonews.net (Source)
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Staff writer covering regulation, policy and their impact on crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.
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