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3.43 Million BOLD Drain Triggers K3 Capital 15% Recovery Reward
K3 Capital is offering a 15% reward after an attack moved 3.43 million BOLD, 99.9% of the sBOLD vault’s assets, in 99 transactions; Liquity V2 and 1inch were not exploited.

Outputs
The Nov. 18 attack drained about 3.43 million BOLD, worth about $3.43 million.
The attacker used 99 transactions over about 7.5 minutes to move 99.9% of the sBOLD vault’s assets.
K3 Capital is offering a 15% reward and says returned funds will be converted to BOLD for affected customers.
The attacker spent about 986 ETH on transaction ordering, with nearly all going to validator fee recipients.
Liquity V2 and 1inch were not exploited, while Yearn said user deposits and normal returns were unaffected.
K3 Capital is offering a 15% reward for the return of funds after a Nov. 18 attack drained about 3.43 million BOLD, worth about $3.43 million, from its sBOLD vault, according to the company. The attacker moved the assets in 99 transactions over about 7.5 minutes, taking 99.9% of the vault’s assets.
K3 Capital said it is coordinating recovery efforts and that returned funds “will be converted to BOLD and distributed to affected customers.” The announcement does not say that any funds have returned, define the reward’s eligibility, or identify the attacker.
How large was the loss?
The disclosed loss reached 3.43 million BOLD, valued at roughly $3.43 million, and the attacker used 99 transactions to move the assets. That count describes the extraction rather than any recovery activity. The more consequential figure is 99.9% of vault assets, which means the reported loss reached almost the entire recorded asset base.
K3 Capital paused the sBOLD contracts after Blockaid flagged an ongoing exploit, a step covered in TokenPost’s earlier reporting. The pause limits activity through the affected contracts while recovery efforts continue. The disclosure does not say whether the pause covers deposits, withdrawals or both, or when service will resume.
In plain terms, the contract pause limits further exposure. The reported loss, however, already approaches the vault’s full pre-attack holdings.
How did the attacker move the funds?
The attacker moved the BOLD in 99 transactions over roughly seven and a half minutes. The speed compressed the operational window for defenders, but the disclosure provides no timestamps showing when monitoring systems detected the transfers. It also does not state whether K3 Capital or another party halted the sBOLD contracts before or after the 99 transactions ended.
The attacker also spent about 986 ETH to compete for transaction ordering. Nearly all of that spending went to validator fee recipients, according to the disclosure. Such payments buy priority in a crowded transaction queue, but they do not establish who controlled the attacker account or whether the attacker acted alone.
Taken together, the 99 transfers and 986 ETH in ordering fees describe an execution strategy built around speed. The evidence documents the cost and method of extraction, not the identity behind it.
What happens if the funds return?
K3 Capital’s stated procedure is straightforward: convert recovered assets to BOLD, then distribute them to affected customers. The sequence tells customers what form the payout would take, but the disclosure provides no conversion method, valuation basis or allocation formula.
The 15% incentive is aimed at parties participating in the return of funds, not necessarily only at the attacker. The announcement leaves four operational terms unresolved:
- The disclosure does not define the base to which the 15% applies.
- It does not identify the asset in which the reward would be paid.
- It does not specify eligibility requirements for a claimant.
- It provides no expiry date for the offer.
Without those terms, observers cannot determine what conduct qualifies or what a successful claimant receives. For customers, the relevant outcome is delivery of BOLD to an affected account, not merely a public claim that funds have been recovered.
Were other protocols affected?
The report says Liquity V2 and 1inch were not exploited. That separates the sBOLD vault loss from a broader compromise of those two protocols, although the source does not explain their technical relationship to the affected contracts in detail. Yearn also stated that “user deposits and normal returns were unaffected,” a direct indication that its disclosed operations continued normally after the attack.
Those statements narrow the incident’s operational footprint, but they do not amount to an independent forensic audit of every integration. K3 Capital’s disclosure also gives no technical account of the relationship among sBOLD, yBOLD and ysyBOLD.
Operationally, the reported compromise was confined to the sBOLD vault rather than Liquity V2 or 1inch. Yearn’s deposit and return functions also remained unaffected, according to its statement.
What did the recovery flow actually recover?
About 131,000 BOLD in borrowing fees paid by the attacker moved through yBOLD into ysyBOLD and then to the sBOLD recovery address. The sequence identifies where those tokens went, but the disclosure does not label them as recovered stolen principal. The amount therefore should not be treated as an offset to the full 3.43 million BOLD loss without further evidence.
The disclosure omits the attack vector, the blockchain, the attacker’s identity, the point at which Blockaid raised its warning, and any forensic account of how the initial exploit bypassed the sBOLD contracts. It gives no recovery deadline, customer reimbursement timetable or public forensic report. The missing details leave customers dependent on K3 Capital’s coordination and on whether any return becomes verifiable through the stated conversion and distribution process.
The next checkpoint is operational: K3 Capital must show whether recovered assets reach customers. The company has announced neither a recovery deadline nor an expiry for the 15% incentive.
via tokenpost.com (Source)
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Staff writer covering regulation, policy and their impact on crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.
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