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Ledger Confirms JavaScript Incident Across 178 Organization Websites
Ledger said a third-party Optimizely JavaScript incident affected 178 organization websites on November 16, 2026 without compromising device security; 1 of 188 infected snippets remained.

Outputs
Optimizely said it contained a Web Experimentation incident on November 16, 2026.
Malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of 178 organization websites, according to Scott Helme.
Ledger said device security architecture and users' private keys remained protected.
The malware targeted addresses across BTC, ETH, EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin.
One of 188 infected snippets remained, down from 169.
By Daniel Okafor
On November 16, 2026, website optimization platform Optimizely said it had discovered and contained a security incident affecting some customers of its Web Experimentation platform. It blocked the vulnerable path, removed the injected code and contacted affected customers directly.
Ledger then confirmed that its team had remediated the issue and that malicious code was no longer being served through the Ledger website. The wallet maker said the incident did not affect the security architecture of Ledger devices and that users' private keys remained protected by their devices.
What happened across 178 websites?
Security researcher Scott Helme said malicious JavaScript was served on November 16 to visitors of 178 organizations' websites across several sectors through the Optimizely Web Experimentation platform. The affected sites included Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock.
According to Helme, the malware was a multi-purpose kit. It replaced cryptocurrency wallet addresses with addresses controlled by the attacker, skimmed payment cards, stole cookies and screenshots, and delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits to iPhone and iPad devices.
The wallet-address function searched for any valid address associated with BTC, ETH and EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin. When it found one, the script replaced it with the attacker's address.
The operational risk was a change in payment destination for someone relying on an address displayed by an affected site, not private-key extraction from a hardware wallet. The company said the device, not the website, remains the protection layer for private keys. It did not report that the incident compromised the core security of its wallet products.
How much malicious code remains?
The disclosed cleanup figures put the remaining count at 1 of 188 infected snippets, down from 169. Optimizely said it had blocked the path that allowed the vulnerable script to be injected and removed the malicious code. Most of the malicious code had been removed by the disclosed update, and Ledger said its website was no longer serving it.
The disclosure did not identify the organization associated with the final snippet or specify how many site visitors, if any, lost funds or suffered data theft.
That distinction matters because serving malicious JavaScript to visitors does not, by itself, establish that every visitor was exploited or that every transaction sent to a replacement address moved to the attacker. The described kit contained several collection and delivery mechanisms, but the available account gave no victim or loss total.
What does the incident change?
The main structural issue sits in third-party script delivery: a trusted dependency can alter what visitors see and do without breaking the host website's own code or infrastructure. In this case, affected sites did not need to suffer an infrastructure failure for the injected script to reach their pages through the experimentation platform.
For Ledger, the disclosed business consequence was narrower than a device compromise. Ledger remediated its site and stopped serving the malicious code, while Optimizely contacted affected customers. Across the broader set of 178 organizations, the same script created risks involving cryptocurrency payments, payment cards, browser data, screenshots and iOS devices.
No disclosure quantified notification completion across all affected organizations, and no loss figure was reported. Ledger also did not say whether its own users had sent funds to a substituted address.
No public removal deadline appeared in the disclosed update; the next test is whether Optimizely clears the final snippet and verifies customer deployments, with third-party script delivery still the exposed link.
via cryptonews.net (Source)
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Correspondent covering people, launches and day-to-day practice in crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.
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