0x601ee0da601e…601ee0d7
Ledger Confirms Supply-Chain Malware via Optimizely Scripts
Ledger says private keys were never at risk after malicious code injected via Optimizely hit 178 firms. Visitor counts and loss figures remain undisclosed.

Outputs
Ledger confirmed its website served malicious JavaScript injected via Optimizely's Experimentation service.
A scan of 1,611 Optimizely scripts found 188 infected scripts across 178 organizations, including Ledger.
Optimizely said it fixed the vulnerability in an update at 8:02 p.m. ET Nov. 16; infected files appeared clean from 6:11 p.m. ET.
The injected code could swap crypto addresses, capture card details, cookies and screenshots, and deliver iOS exploit kits.
Ledger did not quantify visitor exposure or report losses; it said hardware-wallet security and private keys remained protected.
Hardware-wallet maker Ledger has confirmed that its website served malicious JavaScript injected through Optimizely, a third-party experimentation and A/B-testing service, in a supply-chain compromise that affected at least 178 organizations. Ledger stated that its hardware-wallet security and users' private keys remained protected throughout the incident, though the company did not quantify how many site visitors encountered the code or report any customer losses. The absence of those figures is itself the story's central gap.
The attack vector was not Ledger's own infrastructure. Optimizely disclosed that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation service to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects — meaning any compromised snippet would execute on customer sites with the trust those sites carry.
How widespread was the injection?
A scan of 1,611 Optimizely scripts found 188 infected scripts tied to 178 organizations, including Ledger. That is roughly one in nine scripts compromised, a striking share for a single vendor incident. Whether Ledger's exposure matched that average, or was worse, remains unknown; Ledger has not published visitor counts.
According to the analysis, the injected code could:
- swap cryptocurrency addresses entered by users — the classic wallet-drainer pattern that turns a web session into a direct theft attempt;
- capture payment-card details;
- harvest browser cookies, including session tokens;
- take screenshots of affected pages;
- deliver exploit kits targeting iOS devices.
For a hardware-wallet vendor, the address-swap capability is the most consequential. A user transacting through an infected page could be induced to send funds to an attacker-controlled address even while their private keys never left the device. Ledger's assurance about key protection is accurate but narrower than it may sound; it does not cover funds lost to clipboard-style substitution.
What has been fixed, and when?
Optimizely provided its timeline in an incident update posted at 8:02 p.m. ET on November 16, or 01:02 UTC on November 17. The company said it had fixed the underlying vulnerability, removed the injected code, secured the affected accounts, and added protections against unauthorized code delivery. It listed the incident's status as "Monitoring."
Independent checks suggest the cleanup held. All infected Optimizely files had appeared clean since 6:11 p.m. ET on November 16, or 23:11 UTC — roughly two hours before Optimizely's formal status update. That gap between observed remediation and official confirmation is typical of incident response, but it leaves unresolved the question of how long the malicious code ran before detection. Neither company has disclosed a start date for the injection.
Why third-party scripts remain the weak link
The incident fits an established pattern: attackers compromise a trusted intermediary — a marketing tag, an analytics snippet, a content-delivery setting — rather than the target's servers. Ledger's hardware isolation did its job in this case, according to the company. But the web layer around a wallet vendor is where address substitution does its damage, and that layer depended on Optimizely's security posture.
Optimizely said it continues to monitor the incident. Ledger has not announced compensation terms, a customer-notification schedule, or a post-incident report; the practical question for affected users is whether any transactions initiated during the exposure window went to substituted addresses, and neither company has addressed that directly.
via tokenpost.com (Source)
More from Elena Vasquez
Show full bio
Staff writer covering regulation, policy and their impact on crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.
1,525 articles