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ConfirmedSecurity581 vB126 sat/vB3 min decode

Compromised Optimizly Script Hit 178 Sites in Supply-Chain Crypto Theft

A flaw in Optimizely's signup flow let attackers swap wallet addresses and skim cards across 178 sites including HSBC and Ledger, tracing about $7,040 to linked wallets.

Hackers plant crypto-stealing code on 178 major websites, including HSBC and Ledger
WitnessHackers plant crypto-stealing code on 178 major websites, including HSBC and LedgeriAmMrRob / pixabay

Outputs

  1. Hackers injected crypto-stealing code into 178 websites via a flaw in Optimizely's signup flow exploited on Nov. 16.

  2. Affected organizations include HSBC, Salesforce, the BBC and Ledger; 38 of the 178 are financial firms.

  3. The script swapped wallet addresses across nine chains and skimmed payment-card data; linked wallets received about $7,040.

  4. Hudson Rock found similar code moving through three other web services, starting Nov. 13.

  5. Optimizely removed the payload and fixed the flaw.

Hackers pushed crypto-stealing and card-skimming code to 178 major websites, including HSBC, Salesforce, the BBC and hardware wallet maker Ledger, through a single compromised vendor: web-testing platform Optimizely.

The attackers exploited a flaw in Optimizely's account signup flow on Nov. 16 to inject rogue code into customer projects, the company said. Optimizely has since removed the payload and closed the vulnerability. Representatives for Optimizely, Ledger and HSBC did not immediately respond to CoinDesk's requests for comment.

The breach did not require touching any affected site directly. Websites embed Optimizely snippets to run layout and copy experiments, so every visitor's browser executes the vendor's code automatically on each page load. One break-in at the vendor propagated malicious JavaScript to hundreds of customer domains at once.

What did the malicious code actually do?

The payload targeted sites that accept crypto payments. It scanned pages for wallet addresses on Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, Tron and five other networks, then replaced them with attacker-controlled addresses — both in form fields and in text a visitor copied to the clipboard. A user who pasted a substituted address and approved the transfer sent funds straight to the attacker.

The script went further than address swapping. According to the research, it:

  • skimmed card numbers entered into site payment forms;
  • copied cookies and captured screenshots from visitor sessions;
  • served exploit kits targeting older iPhone models.

Address substitution is an old technique in crypto theft, and it persists because the attacker never needs to break a wallet. Changing what a user copies before pressing send is sufficient.

Who was in the blast radius?

Six of the organizations identified by security researcher Scott Helme are crypto or trading businesses: Ledger, IG Group Holdings Plc, OANDA's Coinpass, Interactive Investor, TMS Brokers and Betashares. Another 32 are banks and financial companies.

Wallets linked to the attack had received roughly $7,040, mostly in Bitcoin, by Monday evening, according to tracking by Report URI. Bloomberg could not independently verify the figure. Modest on-chain proceeds suggest early interception — but the skimmed card data and harvested cookies carry consequences that outlast the wallet haul.

Why supply-chain attacks keep working

Websites execute whatever code their vendors deliver, which makes third-party scripts a structural single point of failure. Optimizely was not the only route. Hudson Rock, a firm that tracks infostealer malware, found similar code moving through three other web services, beginning with an earlier wave on Nov. 13.

None of the firms tracing the attack have linked it to AI tooling. Optimizely attributed the incident to the signup-process flaw, and the cascade of copycat deployments across multiple services indicates the technique is now circulating among more than one operator.

What does this change for practitioners?

For exchanges, wallet vendors and any checkout flow handling crypto addresses, the incident reframes clipboard-hijacking and address substitution as a vendor-risk problem, not only an endpoint problem. Subresource integrity, script allow-listing and address verification at confirmation time each blunt a different leg of this attack. For treasury teams, it reinforces the case for address whitelisting and test transfers before large disbursements.

The attack window itself has closed — Optimizely removed the payload and patched the signup flaw — but the three additional services identified by Hudson Rock, and the Nov. 13 precursor wave, leave open the question of how widely the same kit ran before detection, and whether the skimmed card data surfaces in fraud in the weeks ahead.

via cryptonews.net (Source)

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Nathan Brooks

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Market editor covering money, funding and market shifts around crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.

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