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Optimizely Supply Chain Attack Hit 186 Sites, Targeting Crypto Wallets
Hackers injected wallet-swapping JavaScript into Optimizely scripts across 186 sites, including Ledger and Coinpass pages. StepSecurity traced about $6,600 to four attacker wallets.

Outputs
Malicious Optimizely scripts infected 186 websites, including pages tied to Ledger and Coinpass, on Nov. 16.
StepSecurity traced approximately $6,600 in wallet activity and holdings to four attacker addresses, led by 0.0853 BTC (~$5,575).
The malware could replace wallet addresses for eight cryptocurrencies and intercept clipboard copy actions.
Optimizely was cleaning files by 21:32 UTC on Nov. 16, but 41 of 188 compromised scripts remained infected.
The attacker domain 1688360.cc was registered the morning of the attack and hosted on Google Cloud.
Attackers compromised Optimizely website scripts to push cryptocurrency-stealing JavaScript across 186 websites, including pages associated with hardware wallet maker Ledger and crypto exchange Coinpass, with researchers tracing roughly $6,600 in activity and holdings to four linked wallets. Cybersecurity firm StepSecurity laid out the campaign, dubbed OPTIMJACK, in a Nov. 17 investigation. Security researcher Scott Helme had identified the 186 infected sites and 188 compromised script files a day earlier, on Nov. 16.
The affected list ranged well beyond crypto. Trading platforms IG and Interactive Investor were hit, as were Salesforce, Zoom, CNN and the BBC. The reach came from a single choke point: Optimizely, a platform businesses use to test and optimize website content. By injecting malicious code into Optimizely-delivered scripts, the attackers reached visitors across all those domains without touching any company's own infrastructure.
What did the malware actually do?
The script's core job was address substitution. It targeted eight cryptocurrencies — Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tron, Solana, Litecoin, Toncoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin — by spotting wallet addresses displayed on affected sites and swapping them for attacker-controlled ones.
The code was picky about its targets. It checked whether an address was valid for its respective blockchain and looked for nearby payment-related terms like "wallet," "deposit" or "send" before making a swap. That validation kept false positives down and made the replacement harder to spot.
The attack surface went far beyond visible page text. According to StepSecurity, the script could modify addresses in form fields, links and clipboard operations. It could intercept a user's copy action, so someone copying a legitimate deposit address would paste the attacker's address into their wallet app instead. The code also extended into browser sharing functions and network requests — covering most of the ways cryptocurrency addresses move around online.
Crucially, none of this required users to install software or approve a browser extension. The payload ran simply because a trusted third-party script had been tampered with.
How much money reached the attackers?
Blockchain records examined by StepSecurity showed four campaign-linked addresses had received funds or held assets worth approximately $6,600 at Nov. 16 prices. Bitcoin made up the largest share: one attacker-controlled address received 0.0853 BTC, valued around $5,575, across five transactions. A single transaction moved 0.0761 BTC — roughly $4,970 — through three outputs.
The smaller chains tell a thinner story:
- The Litecoin address received 17.02 LTC, worth $763.
- The Ethereum address recorded 0.0745 ETH, approximately $136.
- A Tron address held 178.8 TRX and 116.09 USDT, valued at about $171 combined.
- The Toncoin, Solana, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin addresses had recorded no transactions when checked.
One caveat matters here. Some Ethereum and Tron wallet activity predated the Nov. 16 attack, so the $6,600 figure represents associated wallet activity and holdings — not a confirmed total of funds stolen during the campaign itself.
How did the attack unfold?
Public website scans first caught the malicious scripts on Nov. 16, when they began loading code from the attacker-controlled domain 1688360.cc. StepSecurity found the domain had been registered that same morning and was hosted on Google Cloud infrastructure.
The attackers iterated fast. The malicious JavaScript was modified at least four times within two hours, growing from 28,877 bytes to 30,430 bytes as the payload evolved.
Cryptocurrency theft wasn't the only capability. The code contained functionality to collect payment card information, browser cookies and screenshots, and could deliver additional malicious scripts to iPhones and iPads.
Cleanup started quickly but didn't finish on day one. By roughly 21:32 UTC on Nov. 16, Helme reported Optimizely was cleaning affected files — yet 41 of the 188 compromised scripts were still infected at that point. StepSecurity also documented a GitLab page where an Optimizely-hosted script loaded the attackers' JavaScript; that GitLab script was later cleaned, while the malicious payload server remained accessible.
Why this fits a wider pattern?
The incident lands amid a run of attacks on wallet users. In October, fake Ledger websites appeared in Google search results attempting to collect wallet recovery phrases. More recently, an Ethereum user lost $50,000 in USDT after copying a fraudulent address designed to resemble the intended recipient's wallet, according to Scam Sniffer. Ledger has also faced legal action over a previous supply chain incident — its compromised Connect Kit — after attackers distributed malicious software capable of redirecting crypto transactions.
For any business loading third-party scripts, the operational lesson is blunt: a compromise at one vendor becomes a compromise everywhere that vendor's code runs. Expect platforms like Optimizely to face sharper scrutiny over script integrity controls — and subresource integrity enforcement — as incident responders finish attributing this campaign and affected companies assess exposure.
via crypto.news (Source)
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Correspondent covering people, launches and day-to-day practice in crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.
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