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Optimizely Script Compromise Hit 178 Sites With Wallet and Card Skimmers

Malware injected via Optimizely scripts hit 178 sites including Ledger and BBC, swapping copied crypto wallet addresses and harvesting card details for some 17 hours.

Hackers inject credit card, crypto-stealing malware into 178 major websites
WitnessHackers inject credit card, crypto-stealing malware into 178 major websitesTheDigitalWay / pixabay

Outputs

  1. 178 organizations affected by malware injected through Optimizely-hosted scripts on Monday.

  2. Malware replaced copied crypto wallet addresses and captured credit card details, per StepSecurity.

  3. First injection observed on BBC at ~4:21 am UTC; most code removed by 9:52 pm UTC.

  4. Ledger, OANDA, Coinpass, IG, Salesforce, IKEA, Zoom, BBC and CNN among affected brands.

  5. Campaign dubbed 'Optimjack' by researcher Amirul Iman.

Attackers injected credit card and cryptocurrency-stealing malware into websites operated by 178 organizations on Monday through compromised scripts hosted on the Optimizely website optimization platform, according to security researchers. The list of affected properties includes hardware wallet maker Ledger, brokerages OANDA and Coinpass, trading platforms IG, Interactive Investor and TMS Brokers, and mainstream brands such as Salesforce, IKEA, Zoom, the BBC and CNN.

Researcher Amirul Iman, who dubbed the campaign “Optimjack,” traced the malicious code to scripts delivered via Optimizely’s infrastructure. A separate analysis by cybersecurity firm StepSecurity detailed the malware’s behavior, and Report URI’s investigation established the full scope of the compromise.

What did the malware actually do?

Two functions matter for practitioners. First, the code replaced legitimate cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled alternatives at the moment a visitor copied an address from the page. A user pasting a destination address into an exchange withdrawal or a wallet transfer had a real chance of sending funds to the attacker without any visual cue.

Second, the malware captured credit card details entered into website forms. Any visitor who typed payment information into an affected checkout or lead-generation form during the exposure window potentially handed those credentials to the operators.

The exposure window itself was short but wide. The BBC was among the first sites observed serving the injection, at approximately 4:21 am UTC on Monday. By 9:52 pm UTC, most of the malicious code had been removed from affected sites. Ledger’s compromised snippet was cleaned at roughly 8:41 pm UTC. That is roughly 17 and a half hours of potential exposure across sites that collectively attract millions of visitors per day.

What does this change for operators and users?

For site operators, the incident underwrites a specific risk: third-party script infrastructure is attack surface. Optimizely scripts run with the trust of the host domain, so a compromise at the script-delivery layer bypasses the operator’s own security controls entirely. Organizations running optimization, analytics or tag-management scripts from external vendors have effectively delegated part of their payment-page integrity to those vendors.

For users, the practical question is clipboard hygiene. Address-replacement malware defeats the standard practice of visually checking the first and last characters of a pasted address, because the substitution occurs after copying and the attacker’s address looks like any other valid string. Small test transactions and hardware-wallet verification screens remain the reliable defenses.

The crypto-sector presence on the victim list is notable. Ledger sells hardware wallets to users who assume elevated security posture, and OANDA, Coinpass, IG, Interactive Investor and TMS Brokers serve retail traders. Cointelegraph contacted Ledger, Coinpass and several other affected businesses for comment; responses were not included in initial reporting, and the story remains developing.

Attribution, the initial access vector into Optimizely’s script pipeline, and the total value of any stolen funds or harvested card data had not been established at the time of reporting. Additional details are expected as StepSecurity, Report URI and affected vendors publish post-incident analyses.

via blog.report-uri.com (Original)

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Nathan Brooks

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Market editor covering money, funding and market shifts around crypto and web3 industry at Mempool Brief.

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Optimizely Script Compromise Hits 178 Websites — Mempool Brief