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IOSCO urges finance to prepare for quantum threats to blockchains

IOSCO's 63-page report warns of a 90% Solana testnet throughput drop from post-quantum signatures; Lopp estimated 6.93 million BTC sat in exposed-key outputs in May.

Global Securities Watchdog Warns of Quantum Computing Threat to Blockchains and Finance
WitnessGlobal Securities Watchdog Warns of Quantum Computing Threat to Blockchains and FinanceColossusCloud / pixabay

Outputs

  1. IOSCO published a 63-page report Thursday calling quantum computing a significant medium- to long-term cybersecurity challenge.

  2. Conservative estimates place cryptographically capable computers in 2030–2035; some participants urged preparation for machines within five years.

  3. ML-DSA-44 signatures run about 2,420 bytes, 35–40 times 64 bytes, and a Solana testnet recorded roughly 90% lower throughput.

  4. Lopp estimated 6.93 million BTC, or 34.6% of supply, sat in exposed-public-key outputs in May.

  5. IOSCO will retain quantum as a priority in 2027, while Bitcoin’s BIP 360 and BIP 361 remain inactive proposals.

The International Organization of Securities Commissions, the global body for securities regulators, published a 63-page report Thursday warning that quantum computing presents a “significant medium to long-term cybersecurity challenge” for financial markets. The report said no practical machine capable of compromising widely used cryptography exists today, but the scale and duration of the transition justify immediate preparation.

“The scale and duration of the transition mean the financial sector should start preparing today,” said Jean-Paul Servais, chair of the IOSCO board. IOSCO based the final report on a survey of its members, interviews with industry experts and market participants, and found most firms remain at an early stage of preparedness.

Firms are largely raising awareness, establishing governance and inventorying deployed cryptography; migration testing and rollout remain limited. Firms cited reliance on third parties, interoperability constraints, limited expertise and unclear timelines as common obstacles, turning post-quantum readiness into a coordination and vendor-management problem rather than a purely technical exercise.

What changes for public blockchains?

Public blockchains present a harder migration because cryptographic assumptions sit inside core protocol design. Replacing them can require hard forks and coordinated action across thousands of independent validators and node operators, IOSCO said, because decentralized networks lack an authority able to compel a rapid upgrade.

The result could be a “slow and fragmented” transition. Uneven adoption would preserve a window in which attackers could derive private keys from public keys already visible on-chain, while dormant or abandoned assets tied to exposed keys could become difficult to move if their holders cannot be identified or cannot act.

Why does signature size matter?

The report also examined the operational cost of post-quantum signatures. Signatures using ML-DSA-44, a U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology standard, run about 2,420 bytes, roughly 35 to 40 times the 64-byte signatures common today.

Larger signatures could strain throughput, storage capacity and fees. IOSCO cited testing on Solana’s quantum-resistant testnet, where throughput fell by about 90%, giving regulators a concrete measure of the congestion and cost trade-offs that cryptographic upgrades can impose.

IOSCO did not name Bitcoin in the report; its blockchain examples were Ethereum, Solana and Tron. That distinction matters because Bitcoin’s separate migration proposals do not yet form an active implementation path.

When could cryptographically relevant machines arrive?

IOSCO said conservative estimates place computers capable of breaking today’s cryptography in the 2030–2035 window. Several industry participants argued that firms should prepare for the possibility that such machines emerge within the next five years, potentially with artificial intelligence accelerating development. The report treated that uncertainty as a reason to prepare rather than wait.

It also warned about “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks: adversaries collect encrypted information now and decrypt it once capable computers become available. That turns today’s network traffic and stored data into a prospective security liability even before a cryptographically relevant quantum computer can break deployed systems.

What did IOSCO ask regulators to do?

The group stopped short of creating rules. It urged financial firms to begin migrating to post-quantum cryptography and to build “crypto-agility,” meaning the ability to replace cryptographic algorithms without redesigning major systems. IOSCO also told securities regulators to watch for “quantum washing,” in which companies overstate what their quantum products can do.

IOSCO made quantum a priority for 2027, giving securities regulators a scheduled point to reassess preparedness. The report established no implementation deadline, so the burden of sequencing tests, vendor changes and protocol upgrades remains with individual firms and networks.

What is Bitcoin’s exposure?

Jameson Lopp estimated in May that about 6.93 million BTC, or 34.6% of Bitcoin’s supply, sat in outputs with exposed public keys. His calculation included old pay-to-public-key coins from Bitcoin’s early years and addresses that had been reused.

In September, Lopp argued in Bitcoin Magazine that the policy debate should focus on minimizing property-rights failures rather than simply whether to freeze vulnerable coins. “Waiting until a quantum attacker is visible will leave us with the worst set of possible choices,” he wrote.

Which Bitcoin proposals are active?

Neither proposal is active. BIP 360 would introduce a Taproot-like output type without an exposed public key, and BTQ Technologies deployed it on a separate test network.

BIP 361, co-authored by Lopp, would phase out legacy signatures, although he said the draft has no next steps for now. BIP 360 cannot protect coins whose keys are already exposed, leaving the existing stock of vulnerable outputs to a separate custody and migration problem.

That problem is most acute for dormant or abandoned holdings, where public keys are exposed and the holders cannot be identified or cannot act.

IOSCO’s 2027 priority provides the next scheduled policy focus, but protocol migrations face the harder constraint of coordinating thousands of independent operators before the conservative 2030–2035 risk window arrives.

via iosco.org (Original)

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